On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
> world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
> at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno
> emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be
> conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's
> example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some
> interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all.
I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why
you need a world to have consciousness "as if" of a world.
The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate
incoming data on peripheral nerves
But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent
incoming data? and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any
case it is within and relative to this simulated world that
consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this
because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we
are simulating it and so we "know" what the simulation means, i.e. we
have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes
everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a
ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the
idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's
own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a
reductio against the rock that computes everything.
The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed
it is connected to our world for perception and action. So it can have
"real" (our kind of) consciousness.
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