On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:

But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and unpredictable and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict rather
reliably that none of those weird histories will happen?

> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy
> Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100
> You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you
> iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person
> indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will
> agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next
> outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories
> (like:
> are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.

Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self- duplication. The iterated self-duplication is used here only to understand what is the first person indeterminacy in a very simple context (the context of pure iterated self-duplication).

Assuming comp, the 3-histories(*) are generated by the UD, which is a non trivial mathematical object, and 1-histories(*) appears in the relative 1-person way by a highly complex mixing of computable histories and oracles (which can be handled mathematically with the logics of self-reference). There is no reason for making all relative histories equally likely. It is not easy to prevent white rabbits and flying crocodile, but computer science and mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and first person indeterminacy implies them. And if we prove comp implies them, then observation and induction makes comp false or very non plausible.

Note also that, as Russell Standish recalled recently, white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They are aberrant consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams.


(*) the suffix 1 and 3, in 1-x and 3-x, means x as seen by the first person or the third person respectively, as defined for example in the sane04 paper:


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