On Mar 6, 7:21 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
> >> The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
> >> >  world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
> >> >  at all in our terms.  It could, provided enough environment and Bruno
> >> >  emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be
> >> >  conscious*in this other universe*.  But I think that's Stathis's
> >> >  example of the conscious rock.  It's conscious modulo some
> >> >  interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at 
> >> > all.
> >> >  Brent
> > I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why
> > you need a world to have consciousness "as if" of a world.
> > The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate
> > incoming data on peripheral nerves
> But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent
> incoming data?  

Presumably not that much, since we are not aware of that much

>and to allow the MG to act?  I think a lot. And in any
> case it is within and relative to this simulated world that
> consciousness exists (if it does).  The MGA tends to obscure this
> because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we
> are simulating it and so we "know" what the simulation means, i.e. we
> have an interpretation.  That's why I referred to the rock that computes
> everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a
> ready made intuitive interpretation.  Stathis, as I recall, defended the
> idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's
> own interpretation.  I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a
> reductio against the rock that computes everything.
> The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed
> it is connected to our world for perception and action.

No, it usually isn't. It is usually supposed to  have falsified inputs

> So it can have
> "real" (our kind of) consciousness.
> Brent

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