On Mar 6, 7:21 pm, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: > > >> The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any > >> > world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious > >> > at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno > >> > emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be > >> > conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's > >> > example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some > >> > interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at > >> > all. > > >> > Brent > > > I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why > > you need a world to have consciousness "as if" of a world. > > The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate > > incoming data on peripheral nerves > > But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent > incoming data?
Presumably not that much, since we are not aware of that much >and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any > case it is within and relative to this simulated world that > consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this > because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we > are simulating it and so we "know" what the simulation means, i.e. we > have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes > everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a > ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the > idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's > own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a > reductio against the rock that computes everything. > > The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed > it is connected to our world for perception and action. No, it usually isn't. It is usually supposed to have falsified inputs > So it can have > "real" (our kind of) consciousness. > > Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
