You write "white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They 
are aberrant 
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams." I agree that white 
rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random structures. But you 
also claim that "most will consider their histories ... 
Chaitin-incompressible". This means long programs and no predictability at all, 
contradicting daily experience. Then you say "but computer science and 
mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and 
first person indeterminacy implies [flying rabbits]". I don't understand - it 
has been shown it's not easy to prove that? How has it been shown it's not easy 
to prove that?  And you say: "There is no reason for making all relative 
histories equally likely." But then what's the alternative?


From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 14:58:15 +0100


On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:But if most histories are 
equally likely, and most of them are random and unpredictable and weird in the 
sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict rather reliably 
that none of those weird histories will happen?

> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy
> Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100
> You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you 
> iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person 
> indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will 
> agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next 
> outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories 
> (like:
> "WMMMWWMWMMMMWWWMMWMMWWWWWM ..." (length 64)
> are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.


Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self-duplication. 
The iterated self-duplication is used here only to understand what is the first 
person indeterminacy in a very simple context (the context of pure iterated 
self-duplication).
Assuming comp, the 3-histories(*) are generated by the UD, which is a non 
trivial mathematical object, and 1-histories(*) appears in the relative 
1-person way by a highly complex mixing of computable histories and oracles 
(which can be handled mathematically with the logics of self-reference). There 
is no reason for making all relative histories equally likely. It is not easy 
to prevent white rabbits and flying crocodile, but computer science and 
mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and 
first person indeterminacy implies them. And if we prove comp implies them, 
then observation and induction makes comp false or very non plausible.
"Note also that, as Russell Standish recalled recently, white rabbits (flying 
crocodiles) are not random structures. They are aberrant consistent extensions, 
a bit like in our nocturnal dreams."
Bruno
(*) the suffix 1 and 3, in 1-x and 3-x, means x as seen by the first person or 
the third person respectively, as defined for example in the sane04 
paper:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

                                          

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