On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:



On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.

There is no human observation without consciousness.

There can be no observations without sense organs,
but it is not the job of physics to study sense organs

Sense organs are usually conceived, both in MEC and in MAT, as measuring apparatus. When physics embraces monistic views and embed the physicist *in* in the world they are studying, they do study sense organ, even if they can simplify them in a lot of ways. The carbon nature of those sense organs might be not fundamental. Anyway, since Everett, we are back to normal, the physicist and his consciousness (through the comp theory of consciousness) is back in the picture. Now comp asks for extending that picture to the whole sigma_1 truth.



Implicitly you are. To say that physics has failed
to deal with it is to imply that it should be dealing with it,
which is to imply that it is fundamental

It was fundamental for the greek. Science is born from an
understanding that the physical reality might hide something, notably
mathematical truth (Xeuxippes), or just 'truth', the original "god" of
the Platonists. But you can do physics without working on the mind-
body problem. But fundamental physics is more demanding. To solve the
mind-body problem in a monist theory, you have to sacrify, at the
ontological level, either mind or matter (provably so assuming comp).

Reduction is not elimination

Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction.

That explains why a lot of honest materialist are keen to try to eliminate consciousness, like the Churchland, even Dennett. Now, as I said often, even before comp, uda, auda, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a consciousness than an illusion of consciousness to matter; if only because the notion of illusionary consciousness is a non sense at the start.

Bruno




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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