> > I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random 
> > structures.
> It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.

You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is irrelevant 
here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must consider the 
probability of the program that computes this concrete individual history, and 
nothing else. The description of the entire set is much shorter than the 
description of most of its individual elements. But it is useless as it has no 
predictive power. Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this: 
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html

> White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense) programs. 

No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are both short 
and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in Bennett's sense.

> > But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...
> > Chaitin-incompressible".
>
> In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
> case of you in the UD's work.

This seems very unclear. What's the difference?

> > This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
> > daily experience.
>
> Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
> prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see
> the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
> by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible, 

sure, this still makes sense

> and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint
> for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
> substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
> quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).

Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of substance. 
Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the remainder of this 
message.


                                          

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