# Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability

On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:

I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.

You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is irrelevant here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must consider the probability of the program that computes this concrete individual history, and nothing else. The description of the entire set is much shorter than the description of most of its individual elements. But it is useless as it has no predictive power. Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this:
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html

The entire set of random string is useful to illustrate the first person indeterminacy, and that was its role in my reply to Andrew and 1Z. So your remark is unfounded. We have discussed this a lot with Juergen on this list. To keep its position he was obliged to assume that finite strings can never be said random, even form a first person point of view. You might take a look in the archive. To sum up, Schmidhuber missed the first person indeterminacy. You have to understand that the point here consists not in solving the mind-body problem, but in formulating it in the computationalist theory of the mind.

White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense) programs.

No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are both short and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in Bennett's sense.

But a sustaining white rabbit human hallucination is another matter. And this is what we have to take into account in the "measure problem" when we are confronted with the universal dovetailing.

But you also claim that "most will consider their histories ...
Chaitin-incompressible".

In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
case of you in the UD's work.

This seems very unclear. What's the difference?

It is the difference between a counting algorithm, and a universal algorithm. You might identify numbers and programs, and in that case the difference is the difference between a list of programs, and a list of the executions of the programs. If you have read enough in the archive or in my paper to understand the first person indeterminacy notion, you might understand that, from the first person points of view, such a distinction does matter.

This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
daily experience.

Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
prepared in the state (up + down) on a "{up, down}-mirror", you see
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible,

sure, this still makes sense

and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint
for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).

Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of substance.

I meant "computable histories *above* the substitution level", and "randomness below". More precisely the randomness pertains on the set of all computations going through my current relative states. This is a consequence of the UD Argument. I refer you to my sane04 paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the remainder of this message.

I suggest you read the paper sane04(*). If you have a (real precise, not philosophical) problem, just ask a precise question. We were discussing the seventh step of the UD Argument. It would already be easier if you can acknowledge the understanding of the first six steps. Note that the skipped message was alluding to the more technical part of the work, where the measure one is given by a variant of Gödel-Löb self-reference logics, which I name "arithmetical hypostases", because I have used them to provide an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology, including his notion of matter. The whole result is that comp, with the classical theory of knowledge, is an empirically testable theory.

Bruno Marchal

(*)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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