On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>> Reduction is not elimination
>>
<snip>
>
> Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.

Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter.  Why
"ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*" is of course precisely the question that mustn't be
dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by
insisting dogmatically that "reduction is not elimination".  The point
is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly
(if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that exists
is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents.  That's
literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi.  Despite the fact (and, a
fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as
observers, actually finds to be the case, we can nonetheless choose to
deny or ignore this "inconvenient truth".  But if we do not so choose,
we can perhaps see that here we have the materialist Hard Problem in
perhaps its purest form: why should there be anything at all except an
ensemble of quarks? (or whatever this month's "ultimate constituent of
everything" is supposed to be).  And why should any subset of an
ensemble of quarks be localised as "here" or "now"?

Adding "computation" to the materialist mix can't help, because
computation is also just an arrangement of quarks, or whatever, and
talking about emergence, or logical levels etc, can achieve nothing
because after any amount of this logical gyrating *it's still all just
quarks*.  Of course, funnily enough, we manage nonetheless to talk
about all these additional things, but then to claim that this talk
can be materially "identical" to the quarks "under some description"
is just to play circular and futile games with words.  Plugging the
conclusion into the premise can of course explain nothing, and simply
begs the critical question in the most egregious way.

The crucial difference in your theory, Bruno, to the extent that I've
understood it, is that it is explicitly both analytic AND integrative.
 That is, it postulates specific arithmetical-computational "ultimate
components" and their relations, AND it further specifies the local
emergence of conscious first-person viewpoints, and their layers of
composite contents, through an additional subtle filtering and
synthesis of the relational ensemble.  Hence, through a kind of
duality of part and whole, it is able to avoid the monistic deathtrap,
and consequently isn't forced to deny, or sweep under the rug, the
categorical orthogonality of mind and body.  In such a schema, the
entire domain of the "secondary qualities", including matter, time and
space themselves, is localised and personalised at the intersection of
these analytic and synthetic principles.

David

>
> On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:
>>>
>>> Reduction is not elimination
>>
>> Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
>> reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction.
>
> Please read:
>
> Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
>
> ---
> I think I wrote "about" instead of "above" in my preceding mail to 'digital
> physics'.
>
> ---
> And I apologize for my random use of the "s", and my fuzzy use of the past
> tense for some verbs.
>
> I am very sorry. Don't hesitate to ask precision when you find my english
> ambiguous.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>>
>> That explains why a lot of honest materialist are keen to try to eliminate
>> consciousness, like the Churchland, even Dennett.
>> Now, as I said often, even before comp, uda, auda, it is easier to explain
>> the illusion of matter to a consciousness than an illusion of consciousness
>> to matter; if only because the notion of illusionary consciousness is a non
>> sense at the start.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>>
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>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
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