On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > > >>> Reduction is not elimination > > <snip> > > > Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological > > *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*. > > Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why > "ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological > *elimination*" is of course precisely the question that mustn't be > dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by > insisting dogmatically that "reduction is not elimination".
It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are not equivalent positions, for instance. > The point > is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly > (if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that exists > is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents. Yep. And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist opponents say mind "Is" nothing at all. > That's > literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi. Despite the fact (and, a > fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as > observers, actually finds to be the case, Either or neither or both of reductivism and eliminativism can be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that make them the same -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.