On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>> Reduction is not elimination
> > Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> > *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
> Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why
> "ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> *elimination*" is of course precisely the question that mustn't be
> dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by
> insisting dogmatically that "reduction is not elimination".
It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
not equivalent positions, for instance.
> The point
> is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly
> (if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that exists
> is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents.
Yep. And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch
of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist
opponents say mind "Is" nothing at all.
> literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi. Despite the fact (and, a
> fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as
> observers, actually finds to be the case,
Either or neither or both of reductivism and eliminativism can
be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that
make them the same
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