On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
> not equivalent positions, for instance.
<snip>
> And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch
> of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist
> opponents say mind "Is" nothing at all.

Yes, indeed they do, as I am very well aware, but I've said why I
think that neither of these "well known" positions can adequately
address the mind-body issues, which is what we are discussing.  My
claim is that they are using circular reasoning, assuming the
conclusion in the premise, or are simply ignoring the very tools they
employ to construct their case.  What specifically do you find to be
the error in this analysis?

> Either or neither or both  of reductivism  and eliminativism can
> be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that
> make them the same

I have explained why I think any real distinction between the two in a
materialist schema is fundamentally question-begging with respect to
the mind-body problem, essentially in the terms Bruno articulated so
succinctly.  You haven't pointed out what is wrong with my argument,
merely that others disagree with it.  It would be more helpful if you
would say simply what you find to be wrong or unclear in what I have
said.

David


>
>
> On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
>> On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> >>> Reduction is not elimination
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>> > Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
>> > *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
>>
>> Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter.  Why
>> "ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
>> *elimination*" is of course precisely the question that mustn't be
>> dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by
>> insisting dogmatically that "reduction is not elimination".
>
> It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
> not equivalent positions, for instance.
>
>> The point
>> is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly
>> (if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that exists
>> is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents.
>
> Yep. And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch
> of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist
> opponents say mind "Is" nothing at all.
>
>>  That's
>> literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi.  Despite the fact (and, a
>> fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as
>> observers, actually finds to be the case,
>
> Either or neither or both  of reductivism  and eliminativism can
> be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that
> make them the same
>
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