On 06/03/11 18:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Andrew,


On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:14, Andrew Soltau wrote:

Hi Bruno

On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:

I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the idea that "everything" is simpler than "something".
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything, and you can't get much simpler than that.


Can you elaborate. What are their assumption? What do you mean by "perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything". Almost all words here needs a clear context to make sense. Which everything?
I skipped over the details because I was don't want to be repeating paragraphs of stuff each time I make a point. Not sure about the protocol. Anyway.

Chalmers states

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental ... we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. (1995, p. 216)

Clearly it is a universal property of the system in which we find ourselves, physical or arithmetical.


I understand Chalmers (materialist) stance,
Chalmers is saying that conciousness cannot be a product of the physical, surely the very opposite of a materialist stance?
but don't see the relation with your own saying. I don't see the same words, like "symmetrical" and "universal". Also, be careful with the possible confusion for the reader. "Universal" can mean Truing universal (a math concept), or "pertaining to the whole physical universe, like when saying "the universal law of gravitation", for example.
Point taken.

I simply mean that just as a universe is in some sense a matter and energy phenomenon, and a spacetime phenomenon, it is at root also a conciousness phenomenon.

Bitbol concludes his section One mind, many points of view with

Mind is by itself point-of-view-less, just as it is placeless and timeless. The aporia is the following: Mind is not within the world since, even if it can identify itself to any available point of view, it is not identical to this point of view. Nor does Mind stand outside the world, since it has no point of view of its own, independent from the points of view the world can offer. Wittgenstein would say that Mind is the limit of the world.

I agree, and often say similar things, but of course it is a bit vague out of the context. ventuall I think Bitbol use "world" in the usual sense of "physical world", assumed to be primary.

Also I thought that Wittgenstein said that the World is the border of the subject (the limit if the mind, not of the world).




and continues

More formally, Mind can be considered as an empty space in the triadic relation: "point of view of ( ) on a 'real universe'". This scheme provides another way of seeing why Mind retains its necessity, even though the "real universe" gathers all that falls under the categories of knowledge: Mind plays a key role in the very constitutive relations of this knowledge. Its closest philosophical equivalents are Husserl's and Sartre's Transcendental ego; or, even better, Wittenstein's subject which "(...) does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world" (Tractatus 5.632).

Hmm... I thought Wittgenstein said that the world is the limit of the subject. I have no problem with Husserl's or Sartre transcendental ego. The 8 hypostases, can be seen in that way.


It is the same Mind, phenomenal conciousness, in all places and at all times.

I like that idea, but it is an open problem (in the comp frame).



In Logical Types in Quantum Mechanics I show that it is necessarily an emergent property of the unitary totality, Russell's 'Everything', which fits this concept precisely.

What is the role of Quantum Mechanics. What is Russell's everything? Is it Russell Standish's notion of 'nothing', or Bertrand Russell's notion of everything in math? You might elaborate a little bit.
Certainly. Yes, "Russell's everything" here means Russell Standish's notion of 'nothing'.

In Logical Types in Quantum Mechanics I draw attention to the conclusion of a number of leading thinkers that the universe is static, even in QM. Relativity gives us a static block universe, QM gives us - in the quantum concept of time - a static array of static block universes. Then, by analogy to a movie film, I draw attention to Everett's appearance of collapse, which corresponds precisely to a sequece of frame of reference, just as the movie is a sequcne of two dimensional frames. Iteration of block universe moments, Everett's appearance of collapse, gives rise to exactly the subjective experience of a changing, apparently constnatly determinate, reatliy, which we experience. Finally the punch line. The iterator of block universe moments can only be an emergent property of the unitary system as a whole. Nothing else is in the correct logical relation to the block universe moments. Only the system as a whole is to the block universe moments the way the projector is to the frames of the movie.



It is also necessarily, from the perspective of any specific framework, perfectly symmetrical.

?

Iteration is a feature common to all movies. All movies are seqeunces of frames, for iteration. Iteration per se is symmetrical to all movies. The iterative property of the unitary system, which each observer knows as phenomenal consciousness, is similarly symmetrical to all possible moments.


Other points answered in separate posts to try and keep things simple enough for me.

I will take a look. You might try to not make exploding the mail box of the readers of the list. Lot of mails can discourage people, given that many people have already a large numbers of mails, IMO (but that's just a suggestive metacomment that you don't need to mind too much).

Point taken.

Do you suggest taking some or all of our dialogue off list?

If anyone else has a comment to the effect that our dialogue is not of great interest to the list I will be sure to do so.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>



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