On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:

On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com>  wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance. It
appears, as Davies and others explain, the appearance of collapse is
purely subjective,
It doesn't "appear" in an univocal way, since there are
such things as objective collapse theories


OK, perhaps I stand corrected. But I am sure that no objective collapse theory has been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance.
as Everett demonstrates.
MWI isn't usually presented as a subjective theory. Penrose
argues that it makes surreptitious assumptions about how
observers' minds work, but that is part of an argument against

I would differentiate between Everett and MWI. MWI means to me many worlds in some way separate. Everett is without question, in my view, saying that there is one physical environment, and that it is only subjectively that there are different, determinate views of that environment.
In this case, consciousness
is necessarily central, as it is consciousness, and only consciousness,
which encounters this appearance of collapse and change.
It is only consciousness that consciously encounters everything else
too. However, that does not make consciousness *ontologically*

It does if the physical system is static. If there is no change, objectively, only subjectively, this points to consciousness - phenomenal consciousness - being ontologically fundamental.
We know there
is an effective collapse, or the appearance of collapse, because we
experience this subjectively. On the other hand, nothing in the physical
world, including the physical body and the physical brain, can account
for this.
Whoah! What he have is a profusion of theores, with no clear winner
What I mean is that if the physical domain is indeed static, as Davies, Barbour, Deutsch and others explain, then nothing physical can account for the appearance of change we encounter as observers. Coupled with the inability to find any physiology corresponding to phenomenal consciousness, and Chalmers finding that there can be no such explanation, I infer this consciousness to be ontologically fundamental - an emergent property of the unitary system as a whole.
Whatever consciousness is, it appears to be the phenomenon at
the centre of this process. In consciousness, change is encountered, the
appearance of collapse, and, it increasingly appears, no where else. My
paper Logical Types in Quantum Mechanics
<http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00005554/>  explains this in detail.


On 04/03/11 16:31, 1Z wrote:

On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com>    wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, "... it
is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of
consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most fundamental
aspect of physics."
How does he know consciousness is fundamental?
Given that conciousness seems all too clearly to be centrally involved
in quantum mechanics,
That isn't clear at all

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