On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
That was a rather blanket statement. But if we can doubt the existence
of everything but our minds, then we don't have any evidence for it!
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote:> Collapse "appears" to instruments as
well as people
We don't have any evidence for that,
Of course we do
But I think it is perfectly tenable to say that we cannot prove that the
instruments which appear to us to be collapsed are in fact not
collapsed, that there is only the appearance of collapse subjectively.
How could one possibly disprove that?
indeed, if we take either the
concept of Wigner's friend or Rovelli's RQM seriously,
We shouldn't take Wigner's friend as proving CCC, since it is
intended as a reductio ad absurdum of it.
OK, but I happen to think it is a precise explanation of how reality works.
Yes it does. In RQM the environment is determinate where, and only
where, the observer has observed it. If I am Wigner, and my friend goes
off and does an experiment, the result is indeterminate in my version of
And RQM doesn't remotely have that implication.
Everett states very clearly that with respect to the physical body of
the observer there is no collapse. I think the intruments the observer
is using come under the same banner, the linear dynamics. He makes it
very clear that it is only with regard to the "record of sensory
observations and machine configuration" which I equate in his
formulation with the functional identity of the observer, that there is
the appearance of collapse. This is pretty much exactly the definition
of access consciousness, that of which the observer is directly and
immediately aware. (In the human observer, I take the record of machine
configuration to be the observations of the internal state of the
observer, as I explain in detail elsewhere.)
this is not the
case.> - that's why we can shared records of experiments and agree on them.
Or, we can deduce those phenomena simply from the coherence of our
personal systems.> I'm not sure what you mean by "account for" collapse.
I mean that if there is a unitary linear dynamics, with no collapse, as
in Everett, no physical collapse, then there is the appearance of
collapse only 'in consciousness'.
But Everett can explain the apperarance of collapse to instruments...
he doesn't need consciousness.
At least one interpretation of QM, advocated by Peres, Fuchs, and
Omnes for example, is that the "collapse" is purely epistemological.
All that changes is our knowledge or model of the state and QM merely
predicts probabilities for this change.
That's what I thought I was saying!
Fits my view.
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