On Mar 8, 6:48 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> On 3/8/2011 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote:
> > On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>  wrote:
> >> On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
> >>>> Up to a point.  But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
> >>>>>   this world the BIV would no longer be able to process them.  We 
> >>>>> casually
> >>>>>   talk of "white rabbits" on this list, which are perfectly 
> >>>>> understandable
> >>>>>   things and are really of this world (e.g. in Walt Disney pictures).  
> >>>>> But
> >>>>>   they are just tiny derivative, deviations from reality.  Even things 
> >>>>> as
> >>>>>   real as optical illusions become difficult to process (which is why 
> >>>>> they
> >>>>>   produce illusions).  If your BIV was a human brain and was provided 
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>   perceptions of, say, a bird it would probably be unable to process 
> >>>>> them
> >>>>>   - it would be as cut off as if you provided white noise.  My point is
> >>>>>   that human brains evolve and learn in this world and it's the only 
> >>>>> kind
> >>>>>   of world they can be conscious of.  You can fiddle a little with 
> >>>>> inputs
> >>>>>   to the BIV, but unless your inputs are just variants on this world,
> >>>>>   they'll mean nothing.
> >>>>>   Brent
> >>> I think you can have gorss deviations from physics that are perfectly
> >>> easy to process
> >>> perceptually. In fact that is quite common in movie FX, games etc.
> >>> There is no
> >>> problem seeing a hovering rock.
> >> We're using very different ideas of "gross deviations".  I'd say a
> >> hovering rock is just a variation of this world: a variation that allows
> >> us to identify the rock and hovering.
> > It's a good enough WR, especially if you see stuff that can't be
> > stitched into a single coherent alternative physics
> I agree it's a WR.  But my point was that you can't have a consciousness
> without a world to be conscious of.  And if you create that world in a
> simulation or in for a BIV then either it's a familiar world, a variant
> of ours, or, if it's unfamiliar, you won't know whether the BIV is
> conscious or not because you won't know how to interpret the
> interactions between the BIV and simulated world.

But if you know enough to write a consciousness programme,
then you know whether or not it is conscious.

> You can simulate a world like ours for yourself, plus white rabbits, and
> be conscious of it.  Or you can simulate a world like ours for a BIV
> like ours and infer its consciousness.  But if you simulate a world
> unlike ours (really unlike, not just a variation), or a brain unlike
> ours, or both you have no basis for inferring consciousness.  This
> radical uninterperability is the theme of several Stanislaw Lem's stories.
> How muddled the physics would have to be in order to scramble your
> consciousness of it is an empirical question.  Obviously computer games
> muddle it quite a bit without preventing your conscious perception of
> them.  But if I created a collage of games which switched from one to
> the other every 0.2sec you'd probably either stop paying attention or
> literally lose consciousness.
> Brent
> "If a lion could speak we couldn't understand him."
>              --- Darwin

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