On Mar 9, 1:03 am, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions, > > structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about? > > Say there is a pile of bricks that, under some externally-applied > description, could be construed as a house; then that pile is what > there is, not a pile + "a house".
Houses aren't heaps of rubble, they are bricks mortared together. And why shouldn't I say that such-and-such mortared-together bricks are a house - the house exists as does the bricks-and-mortar. > Similarly if a theory says that > what exists is just micro-physical bricks and their relations, then > just those things are what one should expect to encounter - not those > things + an open-ended zoo of higher-order composite entities. One *should* expect composite entities, because the relationships and binding between molecules are just the way they get composite entities get composed. If you mortar bricks together you intend to build something > Since > the theory of micro-bricks in relation supposes these to do all the > work, what a priori reason would there be to posit additional > composite entities on top of the bricks themselves? Well, under reductive explanation, they are not additional. Nor are they non-existent. They are identified with subsets of their component parts. > In fact > composites command our attention only in the context of observation > after-the-micro-physical-facts, in the form of the > non-micro-physical-facts - the so-called "secondary qualities". So? Something may seem not to be composed of smaller parts, whilst actually being so. > To > dramatise this, Chalmers uses the metaphor of the zombie, for which no > secondary qualitative composites exist, Zombies and qualia are another and much more specific issue. >nor any apparent need of them. > That's what I'm on about, but in a more general way. But it doesn't generalise! The HP is very specific. We can imagine zombies because we don't understand the neuron-qualia link. But we do understand the molecule-heat link, and the brick-house link. So it is insane to say "that is just mortared-together bricks, not a building". > David > > > > > On Mar 8, 9:15 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > >> On 8 March 2011 12:16, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > >> > There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg > >> > the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases > >> > the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still such > >> > a thing as heat. People who sincerely think mind is reducible > >> > to brain states, therefore sincerely hold that mind is not nothing. > >> > If you think that is mistaken, you need to say why. > > >> My point has always been simply to hold materialist theory to account > >> in its own terms. In these terms, when you have reduced heat to > >> molecular motion, and thence to its putatively fundamental > >> micro-constituents, you have thereby shown that there is NO HEAT at > >> this fundamental level. To be clear: it is NOT the case that there is > >> molecular motion AND heat; > > > It is also not the case that there is molecular motion, that > > molecular > > motion is identical to heat, and there is nonetheless no heat. > > > It *is* the case that there is molecular motion, *which is* heat. > > >>there is JUST molecular motion (or rather > >> its fundamental constituents). I would remind you that you have been > >> deploying a similar argument with respect to the formal nature of > >> mathematics, > > > Huh? I have been saying that mathematical terms don't > > refer. But "heat" does refer. It refers to what "molecular motion" > > refers to. Two terms, one referent. Likewise "Muhamad Ali" > > and "Cassius Clay". When someone says "Ali is identical to Clay" > > they are not asserting the non-existence of either. > > >>which was the point of departure for this iteration of > >> the discussion. > > >> Similarly, if you can reduce mind to brain states, and thence to its > >> micro-constituents, then you have likewise shown that there is NO MIND > >> at this fundamental level. "Heat" and "mind" are a posteriori mental > >> constructs, supernumerary to the reduced account; > > > Non-existence of referent doesn't follow from redundancy of reference. > > We don't > > need both "Clay" and "Ali", but both terms have something > > to refer to. > > >> hence the claimed > >> "identity" with the reduced material substrate is properly an > >> additional posit necessitated by the after-the-material-fact of mind > >> and its constructs. > > >> To state this is just to state the Hard Problem. > > > Not in the least. You haven't even touched on the nature > > of experience. All you have done is asserted something > > of an identification that clearly doesn't apply to other > > identifications. It is not the case that one of the Morning > > Star and the Everning Star doesn't exist (which one?) > > >> Consequently, what is mistaken about eliminativism is that, since it > >> must employ the fruits of mind to deny the existence of mind, it is > >> simply incoherent. > > > Whatever. Eliminativism may be the worst rubbish in the > > world. but it isn't the same thing as reductivism. > > >> What is mistaken about materialist identity theory > >> is that its assumptions force it to collapse two categorically > >> orthogonal states into one, > > > You say they are orthogonal. Maybe they are. But that is quite > > distinct from your claim that reductions in general are eliminations > > >>which is simply to turn the meaning of > >> "identity" on its head. > > > You may think that identification is impossible in this > > case. But identification still isn't elimination, and it > > works in some cases even if it doesn't work with mind. > > >> This might be acceptable to Humpty Dumpty, > >> but to a less idiosyncratic user of language it must appear merely ad > >> hoc and desperate. > > > This is getting weirder and weirder. The Hard Problem is > > a very specific problem to do with the nature of mind and matter. > > However, successful reductions don't change the *meaning* of > > identity. If anyone is doing *that* it's you! > > >> One can easily see how the "morning star" might be > >> shown to be one with the "evening star", but the claim that first and > >> third-person phenomena can be similarly collapsed without residue is > >> of a very different order. > > > Fine. Then the claim is false. But the claimed identification > > still doesn't *mean* ellimination!! > > >>A weaker version (the "easy" option) is > >> the hope that one type of material state might be reliably correlated > >> with another (e.g. the neural correlates of consciousness), which is > >> an empirical possibility; such an approach would permit the theory to > >> sidestep the orthogonality problem, which lingers stubbornly in the > >> "hard" corner. > > >> I really don't know why you would consider the above account to be > >> controversial, based on your arguments elsewhere vis-a-vis > >> mathematical formalism. > > > What claims, for heaven's sake? If someone reduces arithmetic > > to set theory, that doesn;t mean there is no arithmetic. > > If sets exist, then numbers do, and if sets don't numbers > > don't. It makes no sense to say that the one exists > > and the other doesn't. That would be like saying Ali > > lives and Clay does not, or the morning star > > has been hit by an asteroid, but the evening star has not > > >> Of course I'm not denying that "heat" and > >> "mind" exist; I'm just saying that nothing of the kind can be > >> extracted A PRIORI from the fundamental reduction that is the goal and > >> terminus of micro-physical theory. > > > I don't thing anyone has claimed reduction is apriori. And that > > is at least a third non-equivalent version of the claim. > > >>And the point of saying this is to > >> articulate the Hard Problem in a particularly pointed way, > > > You haven't articulated it at all. Your earlier claims > > about reduction being elimination were general in nature. > > >> without all > >> that distasteful talk of the undead. The end point of reduction is > >> the a priori elimination of everything composite. > > > What?!?!?!?! > > >> Hence there are no > >> zombies in this etiolated picture. There isn't anything composite at > >> all; nothing above the level of the micro-physical goings-on > >> themselves. > > > How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions, > > structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about? > > >> Everything else manifests after the fact of observation. > >> And that really is the Hard Problem. > > >> David > > >> > On Mar 8, 1:02 am, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > >> >> On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > >> >> > It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are > >> >> > not equivalent positions, for instance. > >> >> <snip> > >> >> > And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch > >> >> > of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist > >> >> > opponents say mind "Is" nothing at all. > > >> >> Yes, indeed they do, as I am very well aware, but I've said why I > >> >> think that neither of these "well known" positions can adequately > >> >> address the mind-body issues, which is what we are discussing. My > >> >> claim is that they are using circular reasoning, assuming the > >> >> conclusion in the premise, or are simply ignoring the very tools they > >> >> employ to construct their case. What specifically do you find to be > >> >> the error in this analysis? > > >> > If they are both 100% wrong, that does not make them > >> > equivalent > > >> >> > Either or neither or both of reductivism and eliminativism can > >> >> > be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that > >> >> > make them the same > > >> >> I have explained why I think any real distinction between the two in a > >> >> materialist schema is fundamentally question-begging with respect to > >> >> the mind-body problem, essentially in the terms Bruno articulated so > >> >> succinctly. > > >> > I don't know what a "question begging distinction" is. People > >> > who are proposing a theory are allowed to stipulate its principles > > >> >> You haven't pointed out what is wrong with my argument, > >> >> merely that others disagree with it. > > >> > I don't recall you giving an argument...just insisting > >> > that materialism means there is no mind. > > >> >> It would be more helpful if you > >> >> would say simply what you find to be wrong or unclear in what I have > >> >> said. > > >> >> David > > >> > There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg > >> > the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases > >> > the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still such > >> > a thing as heat. People who sincerely think mind is reducible > >> > to brain states, therefore sincerely hold that mind is not nothing. > >> > If you think that is mistaken, you need to say why. If you > >> > think the mind-to-matter reduction simply fails, that is another > >> > issue. > >> > A failed attempt at reduction is not at all the same thing as denialism > > >> > -- > >> > You received this message because you are > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.