On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote: > > >>> On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>>>>> Reduction is not elimination > > >>> <snip> > > >>>> Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological > >>>> *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*. > > >>> Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why > >>> "ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological > >>> *elimination*" is of course precisely the question that mustn't be > >>> dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by > >>> insisting dogmatically that "reduction is not elimination". The > >>> point > >>> is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly > >>> (if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that > >>> exists > >>> is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents. > >>> That's > >>> literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi. Despite the fact (and, a > >>> fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as > >>> observers, actually finds to be the case, we can nonetheless > >>> choose to > >>> deny or ignore this "inconvenient truth". But if we do not so > >>> choose, > >>> we can perhaps see that here we have the materialist Hard Problem in > >>> perhaps its purest form: why should there be anything at all > >>> except an > >>> ensemble of quarks? (or whatever this month's "ultimate > >>> constituent of > >>> everything" is supposed to be). And why should any subset of an > >>> ensemble of quarks be localised as "here" or "now"? > > >>> Adding "computation" to the materialist mix can't help, because > >>> computation is also just an arrangement of quarks, or whatever, and > >>> talking about emergence, or logical levels etc, can achieve nothing > >>> because after any amount of this logical gyrating *it's still all > >>> just > >>> quarks*. Of course, funnily enough, we manage nonetheless to talk > >>> about all these additional things, but then to claim that this talk > >>> can be materially "identical" to the quarks "under some description" > >>> is just to play circular and futile games with words. Plugging the > >>> conclusion into the premise can of course explain nothing, and > >>> simply > >>> begs the critical question in the most egregious way. > > >>> The crucial difference in your theory, Bruno, to the extent that > >>> I've > >>> understood it, is that it is explicitly both analytic AND > >>> integrative. > >>> That is, it postulates specific arithmetical-computational "ultimate > >>> components" and their relations, AND it further specifies the local > >>> emergence of conscious first-person viewpoints, and their layers of > >>> composite contents, through an additional subtle filtering and > >>> synthesis of the relational ensemble. Hence, through a kind of > >>> duality of part and whole, it is able to avoid the monistic > >>> deathtrap, > >>> and consequently isn't forced to deny, or sweep under the rug, the > >>> categorical orthogonality of mind and body. In such a schema, the > >>> entire domain of the "secondary qualities", including matter, time > >>> and > >>> space themselves, is localised and personalised at the > >>> intersection of > >>> these analytic and synthetic principles. > > >> I think that you have a clear understanding of that rather subtle and > >> difficult issue. > > >> The problem with the materialist, once they use comp, and thus does > >> not "materialize the soul" is that they have to identify a state of > >> mind with a state of matter. Pain become literally neuronal firing or > >> quark interaction. But pain is not neuronal firing, pain is a non > >> pleasant subjective reality lived by person, and to equate pain with > >> neuronal firing leads the most honest materialist scientist to the > >> conclusion that pain somehow does not exist (eliminativism). > > > Another option is open to them: it is a brute fact that the neuronal > > firing > > IS the pain, but physicalese descriptions of neuronal firing don't > > capture that because > > they are inadequate. > > Except that it is not a brute fact that the neuronal firing is the > pain. That does not make sense. A neuronal firing is entirely > descriptibe in a thrid person way, but a pain is not at all.
If it is entirely describable, the identification fails. If the identification is true as a brute fact, then it is the description that is failing. Since it fails, we can't grasp the brute fact, but brute facts aren't necessarily graspable...that is the point of the jargon term "brute fact". In the world of mathematics, ideas such as brute facts and unreachable noumena don't make sense, because mathematical objects are fully describable. Brute facts belong to realism, where certain things "just are" and there is no guarantee they will be comprehensible. > You can > associate them, but you can't equate them. You can identify 3-heat > with molecular cinetic energy, but you cannot equate the sensation of > heat with neuronal firing in the same way. The problem is that *any* > physicalese or not, third person description of what could be the pain > will fail, because the pain quale is just not a third person > describable phenomenon. I dare say any physicale >se will fail, but then we can keep the identity between the pain and the neural activity, and reject the identity between the nerual firing and the physicalese description >Comp solves the problem by identifying the > pain with what appears to be existing non describable, by numbers, > attribute of numbers' relation. > > > > >> So, > >> eventually, some realize that if neuron plays a role in pain, they > >> can > >> only *associate* it to neuronal firing, and this leads to dualism, > >> which most materialist abhor. That is even truer for monist > >> materialist who are then force to accept a form of epiphenomenalism. > > >> Prima facie, comp, which is also a form of reductionism, might seems > >> to be lead to a similar problem, > > > It leads to a worse problem. The objection to identifying qualia with > > physical happening is that felt qualitiies are not identifiable with > > physicalese descriptions. > > Yes. > > > The approach outlined above resolves that > > with the idea that concrete physical events have a noumenal > > hinterland which is not captured by physicalese descriptions. > > Well, this is introducing magical thing in the picture. If such > noumenal things exist, they have to escape the comp description. Is that so shocking? As I have said, the problems with computationalism, as a theory of qualia, are the same are the same as physicalism only worse. > I can > say "yes" to the doctor if my consciousness and qualia is related to a > noumenal hinterland of the matter in my physical brain. That noumenal > matter hinterland contradicts the idea that there is a level of > description of myself where matter and physical structure can be > replaced by arbitrary different matter and structure, once they > preserve the computational relations, which are arithmetical, by > digitality. Yep. Comp is a bad theory of qualia. We don't know how to write subroutines for phenomenality. That artificial people do not have "real feelings" is a staple of sci fi. > > However, in the realm of pure math, without "stuffy matter", > > no such hinterland is available: neuronal firings have to be > > essentially > > identical with their physicalese (and hence mathematical) > > descriptions. > > The contrary happens. The physical stuff lost the possibility to be > entirely describe in mathematical terms. We need theological terms, > and the whole self-reference logics. I don't see why > > If the quale isn't there, it isn't anywhere: it has no place to hide. > > It has the whole theological realm, which exists *epistemologically* > for any universal machine introspecting itself. And the self-reference > logic justifies entirely their non communicable feature, without > denying them and without trying to localize them in any way, like > numbers are not localized in any place. Localization is a higher > epistemological emerging notion, not a primitive one, in the comp > picture. > I don't think you can model qualia just as being incommunicable. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.