On 3/9/2011 3:28 AM, 1Z wrote:
I can
>  say "yes" to the doctor if my consciousness and qualia is related to a
>  noumenal hinterland of the matter in my physical brain. That noumenal
>  matter hinterland contradicts the idea that there is a level of
>  description of myself where matter and physical structure can be
>  replaced by arbitrary different matter and structure, once they
>  preserve the computational relations, which are arithmetical, by
>  digitality.
Yep. Comp is a bad theory of qualia. We don't know
how to write subroutines for phenomenality.

Maybe we do.  We just don't know that we know.

That artificial people
do not have "real feelings" is a staple of sci fi.

To me that is an open question. Are philosophical zombies possible? It seems unlikely, but when I consider specific ideas about consciousness, such as Julian Jaynes, then it seems more plausible that conscious-like behavior could be evinced with such different internal processing that it would not realize consciousness as I experience it - though it might still be consciousness in Bruno's sense of being capable of mathematical self-reference.


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