On Mar 9, 3:25 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > On 9 March 2011 14:39, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > >> So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e. > >> not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion? > > > No. I would say it is ontologically the same as molecular > > motion, and molecular motion exists, so heat exists, so > > heat was not eliminated > > It seems that you persistently misunderstand the meaning of > elimination in this context. If something can be shown to be a > composite of more fundamental ontological components, it is of course > disqualified (i.e. eliminated) thereby as an ontological fundamental
But that's *not* what elimination means as in eliminativism. The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't exist at all. Moreover, it is difficult to see why anyone would complain about a sense of "elimination" that just means non-fundamental, when we don't necessarily know what is fundamental, and we are going to continue using the term > else such use of the terms "ontological", "fundamental" and > "eliminated" is rendered meaningless. Hence heat can indeed be > eliminated from the catalogue of ontological fundamentals in this way, > and understood as consisting in the more fundamental phenomenon of > molecular motion. Of course the *concept* (and a fortiori the > sensation) of heat isn't thereby eliminated epistemologically More importantly, the concept has a referent. It is just the same referent as another concept. But if your are going to call that "elimination", what are you going to call what happened to phlogiston? "Extermination"? >, but > this is the very distinction we are trying to establish on a firm > footing. The reductionist programme seeks to eliminate any need (in > principle) to appeal to any and all non-fundamental ontological > entities in precisely this way, and hence show ontology as resting on > a single fundamental base, thereby situating composite entities at the > epistemological level. It is hard to see what you mean by "epistemological" there. I don't think it is a synonym for "non fundamental" -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.