On 09 Mar 2011, at 17:49, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 4:30 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
OK. I guess you associate pain to the primitive matter. But that is
even more incoherent with respect to the comp hypothesis.
There is nothing mystical about the falsehood of comp. It
is quite possible for comp to be false whilst naturalism remains
My point is just that IF comp is true, then naturalism is false. Or
if you prefer, that if naturalism is true, then comp is false.
So I certainly agree here.
Computationalism is not per se a theory of qualia.
How can it be a theory of consciousness without being a theory
In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom that
my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
makes elementary arithmetic a theory of everything, with both quanta
and qualia derivable from digital machine's self-reference.
Yep. Comp is a bad theory of qualia.
As I said, Comp is the assumption that qualia are preserved through
functional substitution at some level. A theory of qualia emerges
the self-reference logic.
A theory of indescribable something-or-others does
More precisely, a theory of describable and indescribable "oneself"
can prove and infer about "oneself".
But then if you abandon comp at this stage, it means I have made my
point. I thought you were defending COMP + MAT(*)
I was pointing out that COMP does not imply not-MAT once
PLATO is dropped. COMP may be a bad theory for other reasons.
COMP makes no sense at all without "Plato" (that is we need to believe
that phi_x(y) converges or does not converge. No more is needed for
the epistemological reversal. Or show the flaw in UDA, or show where
more than such "Plato" is used.
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
Here's one: minds can be computed, but they only have
real conscious if they run "on the metal" (at the zeroth
level of abstraction). That's not your version of COMP,
but it is adequate for most AI researchers, and for
anybody who wants to be reincarnated in silicon
Then there is a flaw in UDA+MGA. Where?
(*) For the new people: MAT = weak materialism = the common doctrine
that primitive matter exists, or that matter exists at the basic
We don't know
how to write subroutines for phenomenality.
Assuming comp, it is enough to write the code of a universal machine.
For example RA (Robinson Arithmetic) has qualia, but RA lacks the
cognitive ability to understand the notion of qualia. If you give it
the induction axioms (getting PA), you get a Löbian machine, and it
has the full power to find its own theory of qualia.
Assuming indescribability is a sufficient, and not
just a necessary feature of qualia
That contradicts what you said in the preceding post. But then my task
is even more simple, given that machine can access to the
indescribability of their qualia.
That artificial people
do not have "real feelings" is a staple of sci fi.
So the intuitions that underly the HP also
underly the badness of COMP as a theory
What is HP?
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