On Mar 9, 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom that
> my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
> But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
> makes elementary arithmetic a theory of everything, with both quanta
> and qualia derivable from digital machine's self-reference.
Comp is not a TOE without Platonism
> >> But then if you abandon comp at this stage, it means I have made my
> >> point. I thought you were defending COMP + MAT(*)
> > I was pointing out that COMP does not imply not-MAT once
> > PLATO is dropped. COMP may be a bad theory for other reasons.
> COMP makes no sense at all without "Plato" (that is we need to believe
> that phi_x(y) converges or does not converge.
Platonism is not bivalence
> No more is needed for
> the epistemological reversal. Or show the flaw in UDA, or show where
> more than such "Plato" is used.
> >> If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
> >> with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
> >> UD Argument.
> > Here's one: minds can be computed, but they only have
> > real conscious if they run "on the metal" (at the zeroth
> > level of abstraction). That's not your version of COMP,
> > but it is adequate for most AI researchers, and for
> > anybody who wants to be reincarnated in silicon
> Then there is a flaw in UDA+MGA. Where?
You can't disprove materialism without assuming
> >>> That artificial people
> >>> do not have "real feelings" is a staple of sci fi.
> >> And ?
> > So the intuitions that underly the HP also
> > underly the badness of COMP as a theory
> > of qualia
> What is HP?
The Hard Problem
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at