On 9 March 2011 19:09, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

Fine, Peter, have it your way.  We can't seem to progress beyond
vocabulary difficulties to the substance.  No doubt I have been less
than persuasive, and thus have failed to convince you that there is
indeed any substance. But since I have nothing further to add at this
point, I'll stop here (and so save you some typing, as you are wont to
say).

David

>
>
> On Mar 9, 6:00 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
>> On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>> > The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't exist
>> > at all.
>>
>> Just so.  At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't exist at all -
>
> It does, because it is identified with something that does exist
>
>> it's just molecular motion, no more, no less, and any explanation
>> invoking heat could in principle be entirely eliminated by one
>> invoking molecular motion.
>
> Or vice versa. But replacement of a description  by an
> equivalent or synonymous one does not show that
> neither has a referent
>
>> > Moreover, it is difficult to see why anyone would complain
>> > about a sense of "elimination" that just means non-fundamental,
>> > when we don't necessarily know what is fundamental, and
>> > we are going to continue using the term
>>
>> Not knowing what (if anything) may ultimately turn out to be the
>> bottom level doesn't stop us from knowing that, in the hierarchy of
>> explanation, molecular motion is a more fundamental level than heat.
>> And the question of whether we go on using the eliminated term is an
>> epistemological matter (i.e. it concerns what we know and can say) not
>> an ontological one (concerning what ultimately exists).
>
> The question of whether we continue using the term is ontological,
> because the issue of whether it has something to refer to is
> ontological
> (albeit not fundamentally so). We *can* stop using the term
> "pholgiston" because it has nothing to refer to.
>
>> > More importantly, the concept has a referent. It is just the
>> > same referent as another concept. But if your are going to
>> > call that "elimination", what are you going to call
>> > what happened to phlogiston? "Extermination"?
>>
>> If here you want to say that phlogiston was eliminated, then you are
>> clearly using the word in a non-standard way.
>
> No, you are, because elimnativism and reductionism are
> different ideas.
>
>> Phlogiston is just a
>> theoretical term of an incorrect theory of combustion, and hence no
>> longer has a place in the replacement theory.
>
>> Heat, on the other
>> hand, is believed to refer correctly to a more fundamental underlying
>> molecular phenomenon, and hence can be retained as a theoretical
>> concept, though eliminated as a fundamental entity in its own right.
>
> Fine. So reductionist materialists only believe that mind doesn't
> exist in its own right...whereas eliminativists believe it doesn't
> exist at all.
>
>> >> The reductionist programme seeks to eliminate any need (in
>> >> principle) to appeal to any and all non-fundamental ontological
>> >> entities in precisely this way, and hence show ontology as resting on
>> >> a single fundamental base, thereby situating composite entities at the
>> >> epistemological level.
>>
>> > It is hard to see what you mean by "epistemological" there.
>> > I don't think it is a synonym for "non fundamental"
>>
>> In effect, it *is* a synonym for non-fundamental.  If, as reductive
>> programmes envisage, ontology can be grounded somewhere in a finite
>> set of ultimate entities and their relations, then non-fundamental
>> entities (composites) must be aspects of what we know, not what things
>> ultimately are.
>
> They are neither: they are what things non-ultimately are.
>
> Aspects of knowledge would be things like truth and justification
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to