On 9 March 2011 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:

> So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning
> *ontologically* than heat.

Actually, I agree with you.  Of course whatever we can speak or
theorise about is, strictly, entirely epistemological and consequently
those aspects we label "ontological" are properly a subset of the
theory of knowledge.  And of course even in these terms it isn't clear
that the "physical" is simply reducible to independently existing
fundamental entities and their relations.  Even though I was
attempting to pursue some rather obvious consequences of the idea that
reality might be so reducible, I accept that the relation between what
we know and what may ultimately ground such knowledge is doubtless
altogether more complex, subtle and opaque.

David


> When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good to define
> what molecular motion is.
>
> At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard spheres.
> At this state, there was the problem as follows. We bring a glass of hot
> water in the room and leave it there. Eventually the temperature of the
> water will be equal to the ambient temperature. According to the heat
> theory, the temperature in the glass will be hot again spontaneously and it
> is in complete agreement with our experience. With molecular motion, if we
> consider them as hard spheres there is a nonzero chance that the water in
> the glass will be hot again. Moreover, there is a theorem (Poincaré
> recurrence) that states that if we wait long enough then the temperature of
> the glass must be hot again. No doubt, the chances are very small and time
> to wait is very long, in a way this is negligible. Yet some people are happy
> with such statistical explanation, some not. Hence, it is a bit too simple
> to say that molecular motion has eliminated heat at this level.
>
> Then we could say that molecules and atoms are not hard spheres but quantum
> objects. This however brings even more problems, as we do not have
> macroscopic objects then. Let me quote Laughlin to this end
>
> "By the most important effect of phase organisation is to cause objects to
> exist. This point is subtle and easily overlooked, since we are accustomed
> to thinking about solidification in terms of packing of Newtonian spheres.
> Atoms are not Newtonian spheres, however, but ethereal quantum-mechanical
> entities lacking that most central of all properties of an object – an
> identifiable position. This is why attempts to describe free atoms in
> Newtonian terms always result in nonsense statements such as their being
> neither here nor there but simultaneously everywhere. It is aggregation into
> large objects that makes a Newtonian description of the atoms meaningful,
> not the reverse. One might compare this phenomenon with a yet-to-be-filmed
> Stephen Spilberg movie in which a huge number of little ghosts lock arms
> and, in doing so, become corporeal."
>
> So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning
> *ontologically* than heat.
>
> Evgenii
>
> P.S. For those who love heat, entropy, and information:
>
> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/12/entropy-and-artificial-life.html
>
>
> On 09.03.2011 15:39 1Z said the following:
>>
>>
>> On Mar 9, 2:23 pm, David Nyman<da...@davidnyman.com>  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z<peterdjo...@yahoo.com>  wrote:
>>>
>>>> Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a
>>>> difference
>>>
>>> So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically*
>>> (i.e. not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular
>>> motion?
>>>
>> No. I would say it is ontologically the same as molecular motion, and
>> molecular motion exists, so heat exists, so heat was not eliminated
>>
>
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