On 09 Mar 2011, at 19:10, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom
my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
makes elementary arithmetic a theory of everything, with both quanta
and qualia derivable from digital machine's self-reference.
Comp is not a TOE without Platonism
Remind me what you mean by Platonism. In the derivation I use only
arithmetical realism. Platonism per se is in the conclusion.
But then if you abandon comp at this stage, it means I have made my
point. I thought you were defending COMP + MAT(*)
I was pointing out that COMP does not imply not-MAT once
PLATO is dropped. COMP may be a bad theory for other reasons.
COMP makes no sense at all without "Plato" (that is we need to
that phi_x(y) converges or does not converge.
Platonism is not bivalence
But arithmetical realism is, formally, the excluded middle principle.
I accept the truth of A v ~A, for A sigma_1.
No more is needed for
the epistemological reversal. Or show the flaw in UDA, or show where
more than such "Plato" is used.
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in
Here's one: minds can be computed, but they only have
real conscious if they run "on the metal" (at the zeroth
level of abstraction). That's not your version of COMP,
but it is adequate for most AI researchers, and for
anybody who wants to be reincarnated in silicon
Then there is a flaw in UDA+MGA. Where?
You can't disprove materialism without assuming
This does not show where is the flaw.
That artificial people
do not have "real feelings" is a staple of sci fi.
So the intuitions that underly the HP also
underly the badness of COMP as a theory
What is HP?
The Hard Problem
HP, which is nothing than the mind body problem, and is really HPM+HPM
(HPMind+HPmatter) underlies the difficulty of any theory.
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