On 10 Mar 2011, at 16:15, Stephen Paul King wrote:


From: Andrew Soltau
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:47 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Movie cannot think
On 09/03/11 16:53, Brent Meeker wrote:

The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different. Further "explanation" is just muddying the picture - at leas that's what Deutsch et al would say.

by saying that the frame of reference is changed, f

But this is no more than a magic finger pointing to the frames and saying, "This one. And then this one. And then...."
Which is what one seems to be experiencing.
snip

[SPK] One thing must be considered: There are more that one possible sequence of observer states. Not only are we considering all possible frames for a single movie but the frames for every possible movie too, even the ones that are pure noise!

I guess you mean 'computation' for 'movie'. The movie idea has been introduced to tackle the more subtle problem of the supervenience thesis. A movie, in that setting, shows that a physical system can mimic perfectly a particular computation without doing a computation, and its use is not related to the more easy selection of actual experience issue. I suggest to come back on this later.




All of them will be equally co-present in the heap and there is no a priori bias for one over another. The magic finger is a figure of speech of something that selects one of them: how is the one that is “actually experienced” selected?

The comp answer is perhaps terrible, but is quite fitting with the many-worlds or 'everything' philosophy. There is no selection at all. If you prefer: each observer, or even each 'observer-moment' selects himself.

This is already in the 3th UDA step. If you are cut and pasted in W and in M. The one in M could ask "why am I the one in M", and the one in W could ask "why am I the one in W", and we know that there is no answer, by construction, and the comp assumption. In a deeper sense, we can speculate (at this stage) that "I" am both, but such an "I" is more general than the usual local and relative "I", which is the one needed to understand that physics will be reduced (but not eliminated) into arithmetic.




I propose that a mutual constraint methodology such as what has been proposed as a solution the the concurrency problem in computer science may answer this. But this possibility seems to be a bit outside of the light of the lamppost under which we currently are looking for the answer...

In the third person global picture, concurrency is managed by dovetailing. In the physics extracted from comp, this is more complex. It would be really nice to get already one qubit. Two qubits needs the tensor product, and for this we need to tackle the first order modal logic of self-reference, find neat semantics for the Z1* and X1* logics ... Difficult. It is not outside the lamppost, but it is neither in the brighter focus of it.

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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