On 13 Mar 2011, at 13:24, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
on 13.03.2011 08:29 Jason Resch said the following:
On Sat, Mar 12, 2011 at 6:07 AM, Stathis
On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 9:45 PM, Andrew
So, 'first person indeterminacy' simply means that I don't know
what observation I will make next?
It is not just ignorance, it is true indeterminacy. Even if you
have all the information you cannot know which observation you will
-- Stathis Papaioannou
To add to Bruno's and Stathis's point, first person indeterminacy,
even when the details of the experiment are known, is an essential
piece of the Sleeping Beauty Problem:
Do I understand correctly that first person indeterminacy means that
there is for example not zero probability for the next event.
I go along the street. Someone runs to me and injects some sleeping
drug, then she puts me into the bag, and after some indefinite
period of time I wake up in an unknown place.
Is there some other meaning that I have missed?
I might miss something myself, but I don't see any direct relationship
between the sleeping beauty and the comp first person indeterminacy
The comp FPI is that, if I am a machine, I am duplicable, and if I am
duplicated in two different rooms, I cannot predict in advance in
which room I will find myself, from my subjective point of view. For
(traditional) example, at Brussels, I am scanned at some right comp
substitution level, and annihilated, and the information of the
scanner is send in both Sidney and Beijing where I am reconstituted.
FPI says that if I am asked in Brussels about my future, I cannot
answer with certainty that I will feel myself in Sidney, nor can I be
sure I will find myself in Beijing. I am indeterminate, right now,
about the outcome of my future self-localization, despite I dispose of
all third person information. It is the step 3 of the UDA. I can say
that you can join me in both cities, but then I talk about my third
person self, not about my first person self, which will feel to be
unique and in only one city.
Please ask, if this is not clear for you.
A relationship I might imagine with the sleeping beauty would be
related to this problem:
You are in cut in Brussels and pasted in Sidney and Beijing, like
above. Now, in Beijing you (the "you" in Beijing) are cut and pasted
in Paris and Amsterdam. You are asked in Brussels what is the
"probability" that you will find yourself in Sidney (and in Paris and
in Amsterdam). Some says 1/2 (and 1/4, 1/4), others say 1/3 (and 1/3,
And you can ask the same question with the variant that you are
amnesic of the reconstitution on Beijing.
I can imagine that it is 1/2 1/4 1/4 without amnesia, and 1/3 1/3 1/3
But this question is far more complex than the FPI, where it is not
even pretended that there is a probability measure, or an uncertainty
calculus, except the uniform normal measure for iterated self-
There are many counter-intuitive elements, and the problem has to be
eventually solved with the self-reference logics. UDA has been
constructed so as not using that kind of intuition. The reversal
between physics and number theory does not use any a priori
uncertainty calculus. Actually it reduces the mind body problem to the
search of that uncertainty calculus, when bearing on the universal
deployment, and physics becomes the sharable part of that uncertainty
Such type of more complex thought experiences might be a bit out-of-
topic or at least premature, given that we don't have to solve them to
understand the more conceptual reversal issue.
(*) Which I have already illustrated with the experience where you are
duplicated in 16180 * 1000 exemplars, iteratively, 24 times per
second, during 90 minutes, each time in front of all black and white
pixels configuration. There will be
2^(16180*1000*90*60*24) resulting copies of you at the end. The
question is: what is the most probable outcome among:
A constant black screen
A constant white screen
A silent version of the first 90 minutes of 2001 Space Odyssey
A silent version of the first 90 minutes of 2001 Space Odyssey with
Apparent white noise, but actually a description of PI in binary
Apparent white noise.
But even this is not really (logically) used in the derivation of the
reversal, although it helps some people to get it at first. The UD
does iterated a duplication of all your computational state, but
relatively to computations which are themselves multiplied, and
predict that the observable laws for you (physics) are given by a
relative measure on those relative states.
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