> Please ask, if this is not clear for you.

`Well, if we assume that duplication happens in an unconsciousness state,`

`then I do not see much difference. By the way, in Astérix & Obélix Take`

`On Caesar there is an episode not that far from your example. It is also`

`available on YouTube`

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wdDRnmgzqo In the movie it went quite well. > (*) Which I have already illustrated with the experience where you Sorry, I was not able to follow your example. On 13.03.2011 16:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 13 Mar 2011, at 13:24, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:on 13.03.2011 08:29 Jason Resch said the following:On Sat, Mar 12, 2011 at 6:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou<stath...@gmail.com>wrote:On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 9:45 PM, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com> wrote:So, 'first person indeterminacy' simply means that I don't know what observation I will make next?It is not just ignorance, it is true indeterminacy. Even if you have all the information you cannot know which observation you will make next. -- Stathis PapaioannouTo add to Bruno's and Stathis's point, first person indeterminacy, even when the details of the experiment are known, is an essential piece of the Sleeping Beauty Problem: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleeping_Beauty_problemDo I understand correctly that first person indeterminacy means that there is for example not zero probability for the next event. I go along the street. Someone runs to me and injects some sleeping drug, then she puts me into the bag, and after some indefinite period of time I wake up in an unknown place. Is there some other meaning that I have missed?I might miss something myself, but I don't see any direct relationship between the sleeping beauty and the comp first person indeterminacy (FPI). The comp FPI is that, if I am a machine, I am duplicable, and if I am duplicated in two different rooms, I cannot predict in advance in which room I will find myself, from my subjective point of view. For (traditional) example, at Brussels, I am scanned at some right comp substitution level, and annihilated, and the information of the scanner is send in both Sidney and Beijing where I am reconstituted. FPI says that if I am asked in Brussels about my future, I cannot answer with certainty that I will feel myself in Sidney, nor can I be sure I will find myself in Beijing. I am indeterminate, right now, about the outcome of my future self-localization, despite I dispose of all third person information. It is the step 3 of the UDA. I can say that you can join me in both cities, but then I talk about my third person self, not about my first person self, which will feel to be unique and in only one city. Please ask, if this is not clear for you. A relationship I might imagine with the sleeping beauty would be related to this problem: You are in cut in Brussels and pasted in Sidney and Beijing, like above. Now, in Beijing you (the "you" in Beijing) are cut and pasted in Paris and Amsterdam. You are asked in Brussels what is the "probability" that you will find yourself in Sidney (and in Paris and in Amsterdam). Some says 1/2 (and 1/4, 1/4), others say 1/3 (and 1/3, 1/3). And you can ask the same question with the variant that you are amnesic of the reconstitution on Beijing. I can imagine that it is 1/2 1/4 1/4 without amnesia, and 1/3 1/3 1/3 with amnesia. But this question is far more complex than the FPI, where it is not even pretended that there is a probability measure, or an uncertainty calculus, except the uniform normal measure for iterated self-duplication(*). There are many counter-intuitive elements, and the problem has to be eventually solved with the self-reference logics. UDA has been constructed so as not using that kind of intuition. The reversal between physics and number theory does not use any a priori uncertainty calculus. Actually it reduces the mind body problem to the search of that uncertainty calculus, when bearing on the universal deployment, and physics becomes the sharable part of that uncertainty calculus. Such type of more complex thought experiences might be a bit out-of-topic or at least premature, given that we don't have to solve them to understand the more conceptual reversal issue. (*) Which I have already illustrated with the experience where you are duplicated in 16180 * 1000 exemplars, iteratively, 24 times per second, during 90 minutes, each time in front of all black and white pixels configuration. There will be 2^(16180*1000*90*60*24) resulting copies of you at the end. The question is: what is the most probable outcome among: seeing: A constant black screen A constant white screen A silent version of the first 90 minutes of 2001 Space Odyssey A silent version of the first 90 minutes of 2001 Space Odyssey with spanish subtitle Apparent white noise, but actually a description of PI in binary Apparent white noise. But even this is not really (logically) used in the derivation of the reversal, although it helps some people to get it at first. The UD does iterated a duplication of all your computational state, but relatively to computations which are themselves multiplied, and predict that the observable laws for you (physics) are given by a relative measure on those relative states. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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