> Please ask, if this is not clear for you.

Well, if we assume that duplication happens in an unconsciousness state, then I do not see much difference. By the way, in Astérix & Obélix Take On Caesar there is an episode not that far from your example. It is also available on YouTube

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wdDRnmgzqo

In the movie it went quite well.

> (*) Which I have already illustrated with the experience where you

Sorry, I was not able to follow your example.



On 13.03.2011 16:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 13 Mar 2011, at 13:24, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

on 13.03.2011 08:29 Jason Resch said the following:
On Sat, Mar 12, 2011 at 6:07 AM, Stathis
Papaioannou<stath...@gmail.com>wrote:

On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 9:45 PM, Andrew
Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com> wrote:

So, 'first person indeterminacy' simply means that I don't
know what observation I will make next?

It is not just ignorance, it is true indeterminacy. Even if
you have all the information you cannot know which observation
you will make next.


-- Stathis Papaioannou


To add to Bruno's and Stathis's point, first person
indeterminacy, even when the details of the experiment are known,
is an essential piece of the Sleeping Beauty Problem:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleeping_Beauty_problem

Do I understand correctly that first person indeterminacy means
that there is for example not zero probability for the next event.

I go along the street. Someone runs to me and injects some sleeping
 drug, then she puts me into the bag, and after some indefinite
period of time I wake up in an unknown place.

Is there some other meaning that I have missed?

I might miss something myself, but I don't see any direct
relationship between the sleeping beauty and the comp first person
indeterminacy (FPI).

The comp FPI is that, if I am a machine, I am duplicable, and if I am
 duplicated in two different rooms, I cannot predict in advance in
which room I will find myself, from my subjective point of view. For
 (traditional) example, at Brussels, I am scanned at some right comp
 substitution level, and annihilated, and the information of the
scanner is send in both Sidney and Beijing where I am reconstituted.
FPI says that if I am asked in Brussels about my future, I cannot
answer with certainty that I will feel myself in Sidney, nor can I be
sure I will find myself in Beijing. I am indeterminate, right now,
about the outcome of my future self-localization, despite I dispose
of all third person information. It is the step 3 of the UDA. I can
say that you can join me in both cities, but then I talk about my
third person self, not about my first person self, which will feel to
be unique and in only one city.

Please ask, if this is not clear for you.

A relationship I might imagine with the sleeping beauty would be
related to this problem:

You are in cut in Brussels and pasted in Sidney and Beijing, like
above. Now, in Beijing you (the "you" in Beijing) are cut and pasted
in Paris and Amsterdam. You are asked in Brussels what is the
"probability" that you will find yourself in Sidney (and in Paris and
in Amsterdam). Some says 1/2 (and 1/4, 1/4), others say 1/3 (and 1/3,
1/3). And you can ask the same question with the variant that you are
amnesic of the reconstitution on Beijing.

I can imagine that it is 1/2 1/4 1/4 without amnesia, and 1/3 1/3 1/3
 with amnesia.

But this question is far more complex than the FPI, where it is not
even pretended that there is a probability measure, or an uncertainty
 calculus, except the uniform normal measure for iterated
self-duplication(*). There are many counter-intuitive elements, and
the problem has to be eventually solved with the self-reference
logics. UDA has been constructed so as not using that kind of
intuition. The reversal between physics and number theory does not
use any a priori uncertainty calculus. Actually it reduces the mind
body problem to the search of that uncertainty calculus, when bearing
on the universal deployment, and physics becomes the sharable part of
that uncertainty calculus.

Such type of more complex thought experiences might be a bit
out-of-topic or at least premature, given that we don't have to solve
 them to understand the more conceptual reversal issue.

(*) Which I have already illustrated with the experience where you
are duplicated in 16180 * 1000 exemplars, iteratively, 24 times per
second, during 90 minutes, each time in front of all black and white
pixels configuration. There will be 2^(16180*1000*90*60*24) resulting
copies of you at the end. The question is: what is the most probable
outcome among:

seeing: A constant black screen A constant white screen A silent
version of the first 90 minutes of 2001 Space Odyssey A silent
version of the first 90 minutes of 2001 Space Odyssey with spanish
subtitle Apparent white noise, but actually a description of PI in
binary Apparent white noise.

But even this is not really (logically) used in the derivation of the
 reversal, although it helps some people to get it at first. The UD
does iterated a duplication of all your computational state, but
relatively to computations which are themselves multiplied, and
predict that the observable laws for you (physics) are given by a
relative measure on those relative states.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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