# Re: first person indeterminacy

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On 15 Mar 2011, at 19:18, Brent Meeker wrote:```
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```On 3/15/2011 10:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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Hi Evgenii,

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Sorry for the answer's delay, but I am rather busy for March, so I am slowed down.
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```> Please ask, if this is not clear for you.

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Well, if we assume that duplication happens in an unconsciousness state, then I do not see much difference. By the way, in Astérix & Obélix Take On Caesar there is an episode not that far from your example. It is also available on YouTube
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In the movie it went quite well.
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OK :)
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Note that in this sequence apparently the copies count for nothing and are rather easily eliminated!
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> (*) Which I have already illustrated with the experience where you

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Imagine a big screen made of 16180 * 10000 pixels, each pixel capable of being black or white.
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Do you agree that there is 2^(16180 * 10000) images possible. OK? (I can explain this if someone ask).
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Then instead of duplicating you in two. I polyplicate you in 2^(16180 * 10000), and put each of the resulting 'you' in front of each possible image on the screen.
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(For quantum Many worlder, this can be realized in practice, by putting you in front of a quantum screen with each pixel state determined by a quantum bit).
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I think that the quantum MWI can be misleading here. It's often inferred that every different screen produces a different "you".
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Each pixels on the screen will decohere quickly, entailing the contagion of the pixels state superposition with your brain. 24 images per second is very slow, with that respect.
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But that assumes that "you" are a projection in Hilbert space. I find that highly implausible. There will be no significant difference in you_14599 who saw a screen of "snow" and you_86601 who saw a different screen of "snow". Although these are different "you"s at the microscopic level, that is far below the level that supports consciousness.
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That's a reason to defend the similarity between the comp indeterminacy and the MWI-indeterminacy, it seems to me.
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Some movies will have content that makes a difference; but almost all will not.
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The quantum MWI can be misleading here for another reason: to give the feeling that we are postulating the quantum, when it is used only to illustrate a notion.
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But having said this, I don't understand your paragraph. Both the quantum and the comp multiplication generate you_14599 who saw a screen of "snow" and you_86601 who saw a different screen of "snow". Indeed it is the reason advocated in both setting (the comp and the quantum) to predict that we will see snow, because it far more numerous in both case, and this follows from the use of the normal distribution in both case. All what is needed is that such conscious experience are associated to different histories which are 'distinguishable' in principle, not that the person can distinguish them consciously. That is why I add the development of PI. At first, this is just snow, only later, after scrutiny, can the observer see *that* difference. This is used in Shor algorithm, or in any use of massive superposition in quantum computing, so, well me might differ on the MWI, but that's is out of topics, and I think rather distracting, so I will not insist on this right now.
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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