on 17.03.2011 16:38 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 17 Mar 2011, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

on 16.03.2011 17:14 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 15 Mar 2011, at 22:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I do not follow the relationship between replication and the
movie, sorry.


My naive viewpoint is that after duplicating there are two
different first person views that are not related to each other
any more,

That's correct (assuming comp). The question is what do you
predict, about your future subjective experience, before the
duplication is done.

well they have the same diary before duplicating but that's

And they have different diaries after! And you can predict this
before the duplication, and you expect to survive (assuming
comp). So you know in advance that both copy will describe
specific but different outcome (like W or M). So you cannot
predict which one specifically with certainty in advance (if you
predict W, the one in M will understand that was wrong), and vice
versa. By comp, they have both the right of asserting that they
are "Evgenii Rudnyi".

So if someone multiplicate 2^(16180 * 10000) copies, then there
are that number of first person views that are however again
independent from each other.

Sure. So they can predict that they will be in front of some
random image. And then this is repeated 24 times per second
during 1 our and one half, so they can predict some random noise,
or white snow for that period of time. Only few exception will be
deluded by seeing "Space Odyssey (say)". Those will correspond to
"white rabbits events", with probability = 1/

So I still do not see the difference with the situation that I
have described. When I travel to somewhere there is some
nonzero probability that I awake in some other place and I have
just to ask where I am.

Exactly. That was the point. That is the first person
indeterminacy. The only difference, is that in the travel
example, you might have to just ask where, because you are not
aware of the "protocol" in its entirety, but in the comp
duplication, (like in the quantum example) you are aware of the
whole protocol, and still completely undecided about where you
will feel to be personally reconstituted.

I agree with this. The difference I guess that I do believe that
after duplication both copies have the right to assert that they
are "Evgenii Rudnyi" and it seems that you do not.

Not at all. I said exactly that. See the quote above. It is *because*
 they have the same right, that we have to listen to both copies, and
can define the indeterminacy from what they can all expected. In

Sorry then I have not understood you.

This however somewhat contradicts with you recent statement that there should be just a single first person view:

"So I will be franc. The problem of interaction is not solved at all, even between third person describable objects. And the problem of how many first person “really” exist is also an open problem, although I tend more and more to believe that there is only one first person: the universal person described by the arithmetical hypostases. Although personal consciousness is not an illusion, self-identity can be. But, please note that I am speculating here. And there do exist some evidence that the numbers of person could be at least two. That would be the case if the “whole truth” is a sort of person. Very complex question."

Could you please clarify this?

particular, when the duplication is repeated a big number of time,
the majority of the resulting copies get random (even incompressible)
histories. This is not the case in front of the Universal
dovetailing, which is far subtler than the iteration of of
self-duplication (that's why comp is not (yet?) refuted!).

So you understand UDA at least up to step three. And you understand
the first person comp indeterminacy. Do you understand that the
delays in the reconstitution don't change the uncertainty calculus?
That we don't need to eliminate the original for having
1-indeterminacy, et ... Do you understand the seventh step, which
makes physics a branch of computer science/number theory in case the
physical universe is "big enough to run a UD"?

I am still waiting if Andrew and Peter, and perhaps
'digital-physics', get or not that point. Andrew, Peter did you see
the point or not?



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