On 18 Mar 2011, at 21:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

on 17.03.2011 16:38 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 17 Mar 2011, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

on 16.03.2011 17:14 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 15 Mar 2011, at 22:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I do not follow the relationship between replication and the
movie, sorry.


My naive viewpoint is that after duplicating there are two
different first person views that are not related to each other
any more,

That's correct (assuming comp). The question is what do you
predict, about your future subjective experience, before the
duplication is done.

well they have the same diary before duplicating but that's

And they have different diaries after! And you can predict this
before the duplication, and you expect to survive (assuming
comp). So you know in advance that both copy will describe
specific but different outcome (like W or M). So you cannot
predict which one specifically with certainty in advance (if you
predict W, the one in M will understand that was wrong), and vice
versa. By comp, they have both the right of asserting that they
are "Evgenii Rudnyi".

So if someone multiplicate 2^(16180 * 10000) copies, then there
are that number of first person views that are however again
independent from each other.

Sure. So they can predict that they will be in front of some
random image. And then this is repeated 24 times per second
during 1 our and one half, so they can predict some random noise,
or white snow for that period of time. Only few exception will be
deluded by seeing "Space Odyssey (say)". Those will correspond to
"white rabbits events", with probability = 1/

So I still do not see the difference with the situation that I
have described. When I travel to somewhere there is some
nonzero probability that I awake in some other place and I have
just to ask where I am.

Exactly. That was the point. That is the first person
indeterminacy. The only difference, is that in the travel
example, you might have to just ask where, because you are not
aware of the "protocol" in its entirety, but in the comp
duplication, (like in the quantum example) you are aware of the
whole protocol, and still completely undecided about where you
will feel to be personally reconstituted.

I agree with this. The difference I guess that I do believe that
after duplication both copies have the right to assert that they
are "Evgenii Rudnyi" and it seems that you do not.

Not at all. I said exactly that. See the quote above. It is *because*
they have the same right, that we have to listen to both copies, and
can define the indeterminacy from what they can all expected. In

Sorry then I have not understood you.

This however somewhat contradicts with you recent statement that there should be just a single first person view:

"So I will be franc. The problem of interaction is not solved at all, even between third person describable objects. And the problem of how many first person “really” exist is also an open problem, although I tend more and more to believe that there is only one first person: the universal person described by the arithmetical hypostases. Although personal consciousness is not an illusion, self- identity can be. But, please note that I am speculating here. And there do exist some evidence that the numbers of person could be at least two. That would be the case if the “whole truth” is a sort of person. Very complex question."

Could you please clarify this?

To understand that physics has to be derived from computer science, once we assume digital mechanism, you have to consider the immediate subjective experience(s) that you can have in some duplication experience. For example, you are here, and now, scanned, and then annihilated, and then reconstituted in two places, W and M, say. Your immediate future will be "I feel to be in W" or "I feel to be in M". You will not feel to be in both W and M *at once*, and if you have to predict, here and now, just before the duplication is taking place, what you *will* feel, you will be undecided about the outcome of the experience: it will be W or it will be M, and you cannot predict the result in advance. Once in M you can ask yourself why you feel to be the one in M, and the same for W.

OK? That is the first person indeterminacy.

Having said this, you know in M that a version of you is also in W, and that he has the same right as you to pretend to be the original person. So personal identity might be an illusion, and beyond the first person indeterminacy, this is what such duplication experiment also does illustrate. And then Evgenii and Bruno also result from the same single initial amoeba, and although we are more different than the duplicated person in W and M, we are descendant of that same amoeba, and we can, *intellectually* conceive that Evgenii and Bruno are the same person, *in that sense*. This changes nothing to the first person indeterminacy, which concerns the immediate subjective outcome of an experiment/experience. It concerns our deeper identity. We can go as far as thinking that we are all the same person, the same Löbian machine, but living different histories and context, and in that case the number of person would be one, a bit like in some theory there is only one electron in the universe, but by traveling in time it would be able to manifest itself in multiple places and roles in the material constitution of the stuff.

Tell me is this helps. You were confusing two levels of the discussion. The first person indeterminacy concerns practical prediction of precise experience done in a relative context. The ultimate number of person concerns the notion of person identity in the absolute. And this is not relevant for the prediction problem and the derivation of physics from digital machine's theory.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to