On Mar 22, 1:13 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 22 Mar 2011, at 17:26, meekerdb wrote:
> > On 3/22/2011 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> Clearly qualia is a problem, have no idea how it could emerge.
> >> I can explain why universal machine have qualia. It comes from the  
> >> self-reference logic. But only "rich" machine (the Löbian one), can  
> >> talk and develop discourse about their qualia, and have to be  
> >> astonished about them, until they bet that they are machines.  
> >> Qualia are sort of automated gap-filling in self-perception. They  
> >> obey a qualia logic,
> > What logic is that?
> The logic is described by X1*. That is, the eighth arithmetical  
> hypostase. It is the logic of Bp & Dp & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1  
> propositions.
> Dp makes the belief (Bp) "physical", and "& p" makes is "true".  (and  
> being sigma_1 makes it accessible by the UD).
> > Do you take qualia to imply *conscious* perception?
> Yes. I take qualia as implying conscious perception. But consciousness  
> can exist without qualia (I think).  A long time ago, I would have  
> said that consciousness needs at least the quale of duration, but I am  
> no more sure on that.
> > Or do you assume consciousness is an internal discourse?
> No. But Löbian machine can develop discourse about them. Qualia  
> typically escapes words, but some can be related to perceptible  
> fields, like colors, or like proprio-perception (the feeling to occupy  
> a place in space).
> Bruno
> > Brent
> >> and mechanism makes the quanta a particular case of qualia. This is  
> >> even too much 'subjectivist' to me, but then I have no way to  
> >> escape logical conclusions.
> >>> On the other hand, biologists claim that even bacteria can perceive
> >>>http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/01/perception-feedback-and-qualia.html
> >> Do those biologists pretend that bacteria have qualia? I have not  
> >> much evidence, but I would bet they do, as little universal system  
> >> sharing our histories. I have more evidence that paramecia have  
> >> qualia, by they more complex behaviors, and appearance of some  
> >> amount of information flux crossing the cell. But that might be  
> >> some sort of human projection, and I have no certainty.
> >> In case of doubt, despite it might look a bit naïve, it is  
> >> preferable to bet that an entity has qualia, than to bet the  
> >> contrary. This might avoid suffering.

Hi Brent and Bruno,

  Could the qualia/quale question be answered by considering self-
modeling relations? Consider the idea that a system could generate
simulations of itself and, going further, even generate simulations of
other systems other than itself.

Quote from: 

""The greatest challenge for robots today is figuring out how to adapt
to new situations," he says. "There are millions of robots out there,
mostly in factories, and if everything is in the right place at the
right time for them, they are superhuman in their precision, in their
power, in their speed, in their ability to work repetitively 24/7 in
hazardous environments—but if a bolt falls out of place, game over."

This lack of adaptability "is the reason we don't have many robots in
the home, which is much more unstructured than the factory," Lipson
adds. "The key is for robots to create a model of themselves to figure
out what is working and not working in order to adapt."

So, Lipson and his colleagues developed a robot shaped like a four-
legged starfish whose brain, or controller, developed a model of what
its body was like. The researchers started the droid off with an idea
of what motors and other parts it had, but not how they were arranged,
and gave it a directive to move. By trial and error, receiving
feedback from its sensors with each motion, the machine used repeated
simulations to figure out how its body was put together and evolved an
ungainly but effective form of movement all on its own. Then "we
removed a leg," and over time the robot's self-image changed and
learned how to move without it, Lipson says.

Now, instead of having robots modeling their own bodies Lipson and
Juan Zagal, now at the University of Chile in Santiago , have
developed ones that essentially reflect on their own thoughts. They
achieve such thinking about thinking, or metacognition, by placing two
minds in one bot. One controller was rewarded for chasing dots of blue
light moving in random circular patterns and avoiding red dots as if
they were poison, whereas a second controller modeled how the first
behaved and whether it was successful or not."
end quote

  My belief is that qualia are our self-simulations and their
complexity follows from the way that simulations operate, their
algebra if you will. But this posses a difficult question for logical
systems: how does one logical system distinguish itself from another
logical system is they are all identical to each other or completely
disjoint and mutually exclusive? Could embeddings solve this?
  Could space - the difference of place - be derived from the way that
we distinguish ourselves from each other or itself be the quale of
distinguishing self-in-this-place in contrast to not-self-in that-

  Bruno's thought that "A long time ago, I would have said that
consciousness needs at least the quale of duration, but I am no more
sure on that" peaked my attention! What changed your mind? Could a
quale of duration be just another form/aspect of the quale of place
related by some duality and/or involution?

  Can we encode these simulations in Sigma_1 propositional algebras or
do we need a more general form? I have found several papers discussing
the concept of neighborhood frames in Kripke structures that seem to
lead to a way of considering the difference of place, but I'm not




This paper seems also related but I cannot access it:



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