On 22 Mar 2011, at 21:16, stephenk wrote:



On Mar 22, 1:13 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 22 Mar 2011, at 17:26, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/22/2011 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Clearly qualia is a problem, have no idea how it could emerge.

I can explain why universal machine have qualia. It comes from the
self-reference logic. But only "rich" machine (the Löbian one), can
talk and develop discourse about their qualia, and have to be
astonished about them, until they bet that they are machines.
Qualia are sort of automated gap-filling in self-perception. They
obey a qualia logic,

What logic is that?

The logic is described by X1*. That is, the eighth arithmetical
hypostase. It is the logic of Bp & Dp & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1
propositions.
Dp makes the belief (Bp) "physical", and "& p" makes is "true".  (and
being sigma_1 makes it accessible by the UD).

Do you take qualia to imply *conscious* perception?

Yes. I take qualia as implying conscious perception. But consciousness
can exist without qualia (I think).  A long time ago, I would have
said that consciousness needs at least the quale of duration, but I am
no more sure on that.

Or do you assume consciousness is an internal discourse?

No. But Löbian machine can develop discourse about them. Qualia
typically escapes words, but some can be related to perceptible
fields, like colors, or like proprio-perception (the feeling to occupy
a place in space).

Bruno

Brent

and mechanism makes the quanta a particular case of qualia. This is
even too much 'subjectivist' to me, but then I have no way to
escape logical conclusions.

On the other hand, biologists claim that even bacteria can perceive

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/01/perception-feedback-and-qualia.html

Do those biologists pretend that bacteria have qualia? I have not
much evidence, but I would bet they do, as little universal system
sharing our histories. I have more evidence that paramecia have
qualia, by they more complex behaviors, and appearance of some
amount of information flux crossing the cell. But that might be
some sort of human projection, and I have no certainty.
In case of doubt, despite it might look a bit naïve, it is
preferable to bet that an entity has qualia, than to bet the
contrary. This might avoid suffering.


Hi Brent and Bruno,

 Could the qualia/quale question be answered by considering self-
modeling relations? Consider the idea that a system could generate
simulations of itself and, going further, even generate simulations of
other systems other than itself.

Quote from: 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=automaton-robots-become-self-aware

""The greatest challenge for robots today is figuring out how to adapt
to new situations," he says. "There are millions of robots out there,
mostly in factories, and if everything is in the right place at the
right time for them, they are superhuman in their precision, in their
power, in their speed, in their ability to work repetitively 24/7 in
hazardous environments—but if a bolt falls out of place, game over."

This lack of adaptability "is the reason we don't have many robots in
the home, which is much more unstructured than the factory," Lipson
adds. "The key is for robots to create a model of themselves to figure
out what is working and not working in order to adapt."

So, Lipson and his colleagues developed a robot shaped like a four-
legged starfish whose brain, or controller, developed a model of what
its body was like. The researchers started the droid off with an idea
of what motors and other parts it had, but not how they were arranged,
and gave it a directive to move. By trial and error, receiving
feedback from its sensors with each motion, the machine used repeated
simulations to figure out how its body was put together and evolved an
ungainly but effective form of movement all on its own. Then "we
removed a leg," and over time the robot's self-image changed and
learned how to move without it, Lipson says.

Now, instead of having robots modeling their own bodies Lipson and
Juan Zagal, now at the University of Chile in Santiago , have
developed ones that essentially reflect on their own thoughts. They
achieve such thinking about thinking, or metacognition, by placing two
minds in one bot.

That's a good idea, i think. A brin is not just one intergated universal machine, it is two universal machine in front of each other. It is even two brains in front of each others, so that recursively a brain is 2, 4, 8, 16 ... brains looking at each others.



One controller was rewarded for chasing dots of blue
light moving in random circular patterns and avoiding red dots as if
they were poison, whereas a second controller modeled how the first
behaved and whether it was successful or not."
**
end quote

 My belief is that qualia are our self-simulations and their
complexity follows from the way that simulations operate, their
algebra if you will.

There is an algebra (accepting some definitions), and it is retrievable by the theory of the (arithmetical) self.



But this posses a difficult question for logical
systems: how does one logical system distinguish itself from another
logical system is they are all identical to each other or completely
disjoint and mutually exclusive?

In general a (correct) first person does not identify itself with any third person describable thing. This comes from its ombilical chord with (some) truth. Cf the "Bp & p" hypostase. Of course machines can become non correct, and forget the link with truth, and begin to lie to themselves, etc.



Could embeddings solve this?
 Could space - the difference of place - be derived from the way that
we distinguish ourselves from each other or itself be the quale of
distinguishing self-in-this-place in contrast to not-self-in that-
place?

I give the tools to formulate this, and it leads to complex mathematical questions, in the simplest case of the ideally sound self- observing machines. Alas. But, as I said, the contrary would have been astonishing. After Gödel nobody can say that machines are simple in principle. You ask a priori very difficult questions.




 Bruno's thought that "A long time ago, I would have said that
consciousness needs at least the quale of duration, but I am no more
sure on that" peaked my attention! What changed your mind? Could a
quale of duration be just another form/aspect of the quale of place
related by some duality and/or involution?

 Can we encode these simulations in Sigma_1 propositional algebras or
do we need a more general form? I have found several papers discussing
the concept of neighborhood frames in Kripke structures that seem to
lead to a way of considering the difference of place, but I'm not
sure.

I changed my mind after reading numerous reports from salvia divinorum smokers, and from my own experiences. I would have said that consciousness needs at least the quale of time or duration. I thought that meditation technics can make you amnesic of, or disconnected from, everything *except* the feeling that time goes by. Apparently I was wrong. It looks like we can be conscious and completely out-of- time (and space). That seems still outrageous too me, and it might contradict the inner-god's talk of the machine. I was glad that the logic of the first person (the universal soul, the inner god, the third hypostase, the modal logic of Bp & p) was both a logic of consciousness/knowledge, and a logic of evolving knowledge/ irreversibile-time. That was confirming my intuition, shared with Brouwer, that consciousness is deeply linked to subjective time (duration), but I guess I was wrong, and Brouwer, and Bergson too. The effect of salvia divinorum can generate an hallucination which very existence is incompatible with a perpetual link between consciousness and duration. Of course this needs much more researches, both in practice and theory.

Have a good day,

Bruno



mikael.cozic.free.fr/ecce1.pdf

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.91.497&rep=rep1&type=pdf

fitelson.org/few/few_08/sillari.pdf

This paper seems also related but I cannot access it:
www.springerlink.com/index/n82708gm31480755.pdf



Onward!

Stephen

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