On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

> The observation that other people never seem to live beyond a certain
> age is not evidence against the NCDSC. Only logical
> impossibility can count. Even physical impossibility is insufficient,
> because there is always the possibility of mind uploading into
> machines that may be of arbitrary age.

I follow that this observation is not evidence against the NCDSC but
am wondering if it is evidence against QTI!  If we eventually end up
as Tegmark's amoeba then this can be deemed continuous in some sense
but hardly immortal.  My definition of immortal (which I held for the
purpose of my posting) was that it would be more like a continuation
of self aware consciousness - ie the ability to recognise I was
experiencing an observer moment.
> Even Jacques Mallah accepted the possibility that people of
> arbitrarily old age must exist somewhere in the Multiverse. What he
> couldn't accept was the certainty of getting from here to there, that
> the NCDSC implies. The refinement of that debate lead to the distinction of
> ASSA vs RSSA, and the NCDSC.

But If we were to find ourselves in a universe in which we alone were
arbitrarily very old and all other people had ages that  were
distributed about a mean of 70 yrs (give or take thirty yrs) then that
would lead me to believe I was living in a very improbable universe -
I might suspect self delusion!  I often wonder about so called
delusional conditions and  their validity?  In any case I would have
suspected that the NCDSC would bring me into the most probable
universes on the whole ( RSSA?).  Hence if I was living to a very ripe
old age then I would expect others to be sharing this perception too
along with others who were even much older than me.  I agree that we
might just be on the verge of discovering the uploading of minds into
computers, but if I had been a viking in 200 AD this would not really
be realistic - yet they too must still be alive somewhere if the
defined QTI I am considering is valid.


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