On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Hi Nick,
>
> On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> >> Bruno wrote
> >> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
> >> baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> >> continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most
> >> normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are
> >> not excluded.
>
> > Hi Bruno
>
> > Maybe what I am trying to say is that  very old or dying brains might
> > deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to
> > a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way  homomorphic
> > to a young brain.
>
> At the software level of the brain, I think that this is very  
> plausible. It already happens during sleep, and with some drugs. But  
> this can take many modalities. Darwinian selection might even have  
> selected "brain features" helping the recovering of shocks and  
> disease. And what is best than a little visit in Mother Platonia :)
>
> That the dead brain does that, is more Harry Potter like, but then  
> dying consists in following the most normal world where we survive,  
> and this, very plausibly, is not a *very* normal world, despite it  
> obeys the same physical laws. Eventually, where you go, might even  
> depend on you and on what you identify yourself with.
>
> > Indeed this defines the consciousness I am
> > considering and is therefore subtrate dependent.
>
> The UD reasoning shows that there is just no substrate at all. The  
> apparent 'substrate" is "made-of" (an internal sort of projection) an  
> infinity of (digital) computations, that is number relations.
>
> >  If all of physics
> > can be simulated on a computer then no problem.
>
> Well, the substrate is not simulable on a computer. At least not a  
> priori. But your reasoning still go through, given that your mind is a  
> sort of truncation from that substrate, and that, by definition, you  
> survive on the (infinitely many) computations where you survive. But  
> this is indeterminate, if only because we cannot know our level of  
> substitution.
>
>
>
> >> If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer
> >> are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their
> >> consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that
> >> respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists "in Platonia",
> >> and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different
> >> levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth).
>
> > This is an interesting comment!  Are you saying that everything
> > including consciousness  really emanates from platonia?
>
> Yes.
>
> > Would you
> > agree that we exist eternally in platonia?
>
> Yes. (but who "we"?)
>
> Yes in a trivial sense. Comp makes arithmetical platonia enough, and  
> it contains our histories. It is the block ontological reality. It is  
> far greater than the computable (99,999...% of arithmetical truth is  
> not computable, decidable, etc.).
>
> Yes, in less trivial senses:
> - in the sense of the comp or quantum-like form of immortality, like  
> above.
> - in the sense à-la 'salvia divinorum',  which is that we might be  
> able to remain conscious out of time, space, etc. It is like  
> remembering we really are one and live in Platonia. With comp, that  
> would be like remembering that we are nothing more than a universal  
> machine. I have not yet a clear opinion on this. Both practically and  
> theoretically. But there is something interesting in lurking there. It  
> is related to the personal identity question, and who are we?
>
> > If so then perhaps we need
> > only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the
> > steps to this understanding.
>
> Sure.
>
> > This platonic realm is very useful but
> > hard to pin down as a concept.
>
> With comp it is just the "well known" structure (N, +, *), often  
> called, by logicians, 'the standard model of Peano Arithmetic'. If you  
> accept that propositions like "24 is even" are true, or false,  
> independently of you and me, that almost enough. You can pin down the  
> arithmetical platonia by the set of true arithmetical sentences, or  
> even just the set of their Gödel numbers, so that it is only a  
> particular set of numbers. The arithmetical sentences are the  
> grammatically correct formula build from the logical symbol (A, E, x,  
> y, z, ..., &, V, ~, ->, (, ), = ) together with the symbol 0, s, +,  
> *.  For example:
>
> - the arithmetical truth 1 < 2 can be written
> Ex(s(0) + x = s(s(0))),
> - the arithmetical truth saying that if a number is more little than  
> another number, then it is more little than the successor of that  
> another number is written: AxAy((x < y) -> (x < s(y))), where x < y  
> abbreviates Ez(x+s(z) = y),
> - the proposition "24 is even" can be written
> Ez(z * s(s(0)) =  
> s
> (s
> (s
> (s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))))))))))))))))))))))))),  
> etc.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno marchal
Hi Bruno

Okay so in some sense if everything logically possible can be formally
represented in arithmetic as a kind of algorithm, then it exists along
with the UD in platonia.  This "means" we are all in platonia
already.  Indeed could the platonic reality not be equivalent to the
"great simulation" or Schmidhubers algorithmic TOE? I know they're not
actually the same because the latter are essentially encompassed by
the former but it might be difficult to detect a difference.  It also
seems that this notion of platonic reality is anti materialistic like
saying all of reality is more of an idea than anything concrete.  I
think some ancient Indian philosophical traditions hold a similar idea
that everything we see and experience is illusionary and actually is a
representation in some kind of universal mindstuff. Are all these
ideas not informally equivalent?

Best

Nick

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