On Apr 2, 7:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi Nick, > > >> On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote: > > >>>> Bruno wrote > >>>> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to > >>>> being a > >>>> baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more > >>>> continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the > >>>> most > >>>> normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are > >>>> not excluded. > > >>> Hi Bruno > > >>> Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains > >>> might > >>> deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an > >>> old to > >>> a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way > >>> homomorphic > >>> to a young brain. > > >> At the software level of the brain, I think that this is very > >> plausible. It already happens during sleep, and with some drugs. But > >> this can take many modalities. Darwinian selection might even have > >> selected "brain features" helping the recovering of shocks and > >> disease. And what is best than a little visit in Mother Platonia :) > > >> That the dead brain does that, is more Harry Potter like, but then > >> dying consists in following the most normal world where we survive, > >> and this, very plausibly, is not a *very* normal world, despite it > >> obeys the same physical laws. Eventually, where you go, might even > >> depend on you and on what you identify yourself with. > > >>> Indeed this defines the consciousness I am > >>> considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. > > >> The UD reasoning shows that there is just no substrate at all. The > >> apparent 'substrate" is "made-of" (an internal sort of projection) an > >> infinity of (digital) computations, that is number relations. > > >>> If all of physics > >>> can be simulated on a computer then no problem. > > >> Well, the substrate is not simulable on a computer. At least not a > >> priori. But your reasoning still go through, given that your mind > >> is a > >> sort of truncation from that substrate, and that, by definition, you > >> survive on the (infinitely many) computations where you survive. But > >> this is indeterminate, if only because we cannot know our level of > >> substitution. > > >>>> If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. > >>>> Computer > >>>> are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their > >>>> consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with > >>>> that > >>>> respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists "in > >>>> Platonia", > >>>> and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between > >>>> different > >>>> levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). > > >>> This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything > >>> including consciousness really emanates from platonia? > > >> Yes. > > >>> Would you > >>> agree that we exist eternally in platonia? > > >> Yes. (but who "we"?) > > >> Yes in a trivial sense. Comp makes arithmetical platonia enough, and > >> it contains our histories. It is the block ontological reality. It is > >> far greater than the computable (99,999...% of arithmetical truth is > >> not computable, decidable, etc.). > > >> Yes, in less trivial senses: > >> - in the sense of the comp or quantum-like form of immortality, like > >> above. > >> - in the sense à-la 'salvia divinorum', which is that we might be > >> able to remain conscious out of time, space, etc. It is like > >> remembering we really are one and live in Platonia. With comp, that > >> would be like remembering that we are nothing more than a universal > >> machine. I have not yet a clear opinion on this. Both practically and > >> theoretically. But there is something interesting in lurking there. > >> It > >> is related to the personal identity question, and who are we? > > >>> If so then perhaps we need > >>> only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the > >>> steps to this understanding. > > >> Sure. > > >>> This platonic realm is very useful but > >>> hard to pin down as a concept. > > >> With comp it is just the "well known" structure (N, +, *), often > >> called, by logicians, 'the standard model of Peano Arithmetic'. If > >> you > >> accept that propositions like "24 is even" are true, or false, > >> independently of you and me, that almost enough. You can pin down the > >> arithmetical platonia by the set of true arithmetical sentences, or > >> even just the set of their Gödel numbers, so that it is only a > >> particular set of numbers. The arithmetical sentences are the > >> grammatically correct formula build from the logical symbol (A, E, x, > >> y, z, ..., &, V, ~, ->, (, ), = ) together with the symbol 0, s, +, > >> *. For example: > > >> - the arithmetical truth 1 < 2 can be written > >> Ex(s(0) + x = s(s(0))), > >> - the arithmetical truth saying that if a number is more little than > >> another number, then it is more little than the successor of that > >> another number is written: AxAy((x < y) -> (x < s(y))), where x < y > >> abbreviates Ez(x+s(z) = y), > >> - the proposition "24 is even" can be written > >> Ez(z * s(s(0)) = > >> s > >> (s > >> (s > >> (s > >> (s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))))))))))))))))))))))))), > >> etc. > > >> Best, > > >> Bruno marchal > > Hi Bruno > > > Okay so in some sense if everything logically possible can be formally > > represented in arithmetic as a kind of algorithm, then it exists along > > with the UD in platonia. This "means" we are all in platonia > > already. Indeed could the platonic reality not be equivalent to the > > "great simulation" or Schmidhubers algorithmic TOE? > > What is the difference? The universal dovetailer is just an effective > (and older) version of the 'great programmer', and it is equivalent, > in provability terms, to sigma_1 completeness. It is thus equivalent > to 'just' a tiny and effective part of arithmetical truth. Then > Schmidhuber ignores the first person indeterminacy and exploits the > "all computations" idea differently (more in the ASSA way, with > priors). With the notion of digital physics he shows that he does not > really exploit it at all. But if digital physics implies comp, comp > refutes digital physics a priori (with the possibility to recover it > or not: open problem, but there is few chances, I would say). > > So the TOE does not need more, at the ontological level than Robinson > Arithmetic, that is mainly the definition of addition and > multiplication on the integers. The rest are beliefs by (universal > numbers), and, from the point of view of the machines/numbers, the > measure on the computations, or on the Sigma_1 proofs. That determines > the entire consciousness flux, and its many-differentiation. But it is > an internal epistemology that numbers develop from inside just due to > addition and multiplication. > > Now, it is fine, and very nice actually, to use combinators instead > of numbers, for having a less coarse grain of the notion of > computations, but in fine, any universal system do, and elementary > arithmetic is the best known. > > BTW, not every logically possible can be represented in arithmetic, > but all the accessible "mental state" by a machine, can be, including > thought on higher cardinals, or galaxies. Consciousness appears, or > see all that, or part of that, only in the limit. > > > I know they're not > > actually the same because the latter are essentially encompassed by > > the former but it might be difficult to detect a difference. It also > > seems that this notion of platonic reality is anti materialistic like > > saying all of reality is more of an idea than anything concrete. I > > think some ancient Indian philosophical traditions hold a similar idea > > that everything we see and experience is illusionary and actually is a > > representation in some kind of universal mindstuff. Are all these > > ideas not informally equivalent? > > I certainly think so. In the long text "conscience et mécanisme" I > propose an arithmetical translation of the chinese TAO, on some > hermeneutical thinkers, like I did later for Plotinus. Plotinus is > often compared to some Indian or eastern traditions. It is only in > Occident that monistic immaterial monism is so rare. But it "sleeps" > in the Kaballah and in the Sufism. The problem is that most mystical > researchers where just persecuted, so they developed ways to hide the > doctrine which has lead to esoterism and, alas, to idolatry and > supersitition. A traditional failure of theology which already > appeared with Pythagorus. > Greeks were really "rational". They didn't put the mystical insight > under the rug. But all those who like to use authoritative arguments > fears the mystical side, because it is a side allergic to > authoritative arguments. > > The math part exemplifies in a third person very transparent way that > mystical dimension of the universal machine(s). It shows that the > universal numbers are necessarily partially analytical and partially > mystical. This is the main quasi-obvious consequences of the splitting > between G (the self-referentially prouvable) and G* (the truth about > the "self-referentialy provable", even when not provable, but still > questionable). Consciousness is already a mystical state, just that > most of us are blasé about it! > > Gödel did not just prove the limitation of the machine/theories, he > discovered also that machine/theories can discovered their own > limitations, including their necessary and possible geometries/ > topologies, and then transform themselves. > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -
Hi Bruno Thanks for the interesting reply Give me some time to have a think about your comments. Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
