On Apr 2, 7:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote:
> > On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> Hi Nick,
> >> On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
> >>>> Bruno wrote
> >>>> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to
> >>>> being a
> >>>> baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> >>>> continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the
> >>>> most
> >>>> normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are
> >>>> not excluded.
> >>> Hi Bruno
> >>> Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains
> >>> might
> >>> deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an
> >>> old to
> >>> a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way
> >>> homomorphic
> >>> to a young brain.
> >> At the software level of the brain, I think that this is very
> >> plausible. It already happens during sleep, and with some drugs. But
> >> this can take many modalities. Darwinian selection might even have
> >> selected "brain features" helping the recovering of shocks and
> >> disease. And what is best than a little visit in Mother Platonia :)
> >> That the dead brain does that, is more Harry Potter like, but then
> >> dying consists in following the most normal world where we survive,
> >> and this, very plausibly, is not a *very* normal world, despite it
> >> obeys the same physical laws. Eventually, where you go, might even
> >> depend on you and on what you identify yourself with.
> >>> Indeed this defines the consciousness I am
> >>> considering and is therefore subtrate dependent.
> >> The UD reasoning shows that there is just no substrate at all. The
> >> apparent 'substrate" is "made-of" (an internal sort of projection) an
> >> infinity of (digital) computations, that is number relations.
> >>> If all of physics
> >>> can be simulated on a computer then no problem.
> >> Well, the substrate is not simulable on a computer. At least not a
> >> priori. But your reasoning still go through, given that your mind
> >> is a
> >> sort of truncation from that substrate, and that, by definition, you
> >> survive on the (infinitely many) computations where you survive. But
> >> this is indeterminate, if only because we cannot know our level of
> >> substitution.
> >>>> If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy.
> >>>> Computer
> >>>> are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their
> >>>> consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with
> >>>> that
> >>>> respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists "in
> >>>> Platonia",
> >>>> and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between
> >>>> different
> >>>> levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth).
> >>> This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything
> >>> including consciousness really emanates from platonia?
> >> Yes.
> >>> Would you
> >>> agree that we exist eternally in platonia?
> >> Yes. (but who "we"?)
> >> Yes in a trivial sense. Comp makes arithmetical platonia enough, and
> >> it contains our histories. It is the block ontological reality. It is
> >> far greater than the computable (99,999...% of arithmetical truth is
> >> not computable, decidable, etc.).
> >> Yes, in less trivial senses:
> >> - in the sense of the comp or quantum-like form of immortality, like
> >> above.
> >> - in the sense à-la 'salvia divinorum', which is that we might be
> >> able to remain conscious out of time, space, etc. It is like
> >> remembering we really are one and live in Platonia. With comp, that
> >> would be like remembering that we are nothing more than a universal
> >> machine. I have not yet a clear opinion on this. Both practically and
> >> theoretically. But there is something interesting in lurking there.
> >> It
> >> is related to the personal identity question, and who are we?
> >>> If so then perhaps we need
> >>> only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the
> >>> steps to this understanding.
> >> Sure.
> >>> This platonic realm is very useful but
> >>> hard to pin down as a concept.
> >> With comp it is just the "well known" structure (N, +, *), often
> >> called, by logicians, 'the standard model of Peano Arithmetic'. If
> >> you
> >> accept that propositions like "24 is even" are true, or false,
> >> independently of you and me, that almost enough. You can pin down the
> >> arithmetical platonia by the set of true arithmetical sentences, or
> >> even just the set of their Gödel numbers, so that it is only a
> >> particular set of numbers. The arithmetical sentences are the
> >> grammatically correct formula build from the logical symbol (A, E, x,
> >> y, z, ..., &, V, ~, ->, (, ), = ) together with the symbol 0, s, +,
> >> *. For example:
> >> - the arithmetical truth 1 < 2 can be written
> >> Ex(s(0) + x = s(s(0))),
> >> - the arithmetical truth saying that if a number is more little than
> >> another number, then it is more little than the successor of that
> >> another number is written: AxAy((x < y) -> (x < s(y))), where x < y
> >> abbreviates Ez(x+s(z) = y),
> >> - the proposition "24 is even" can be written
> >> Ez(z * s(s(0)) =
> >> s
> >> (s
> >> (s
> >> (s
> >> (s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))))))))))))))))))))))))),
> >> etc.
> >> Best,
> >> Bruno marchal
> > Hi Bruno
> > Okay so in some sense if everything logically possible can be formally
> > represented in arithmetic as a kind of algorithm, then it exists along
> > with the UD in platonia. This "means" we are all in platonia
> > already. Indeed could the platonic reality not be equivalent to the
> > "great simulation" or Schmidhubers algorithmic TOE?
> What is the difference? The universal dovetailer is just an effective
> (and older) version of the 'great programmer', and it is equivalent,
> in provability terms, to sigma_1 completeness. It is thus equivalent
> to 'just' a tiny and effective part of arithmetical truth. Then
> Schmidhuber ignores the first person indeterminacy and exploits the
> "all computations" idea differently (more in the ASSA way, with
> priors). With the notion of digital physics he shows that he does not
> really exploit it at all. But if digital physics implies comp, comp
> refutes digital physics a priori (with the possibility to recover it
> or not: open problem, but there is few chances, I would say).
> So the TOE does not need more, at the ontological level than Robinson
> Arithmetic, that is mainly the definition of addition and
> multiplication on the integers. The rest are beliefs by (universal
> numbers), and, from the point of view of the machines/numbers, the
> measure on the computations, or on the Sigma_1 proofs. That determines
> the entire consciousness flux, and its many-differentiation. But it is
> an internal epistemology that numbers develop from inside just due to
> addition and multiplication.
> Now, it is fine, and very nice actually, to use combinators instead
> of numbers, for having a less coarse grain of the notion of
> computations, but in fine, any universal system do, and elementary
> arithmetic is the best known.
> BTW, not every logically possible can be represented in arithmetic,
> but all the accessible "mental state" by a machine, can be, including
> thought on higher cardinals, or galaxies. Consciousness appears, or
> see all that, or part of that, only in the limit.
> > I know they're not
> > actually the same because the latter are essentially encompassed by
> > the former but it might be difficult to detect a difference. It also
> > seems that this notion of platonic reality is anti materialistic like
> > saying all of reality is more of an idea than anything concrete. I
> > think some ancient Indian philosophical traditions hold a similar idea
> > that everything we see and experience is illusionary and actually is a
> > representation in some kind of universal mindstuff. Are all these
> > ideas not informally equivalent?
> I certainly think so. In the long text "conscience et mécanisme" I
> propose an arithmetical translation of the chinese TAO, on some
> hermeneutical thinkers, like I did later for Plotinus. Plotinus is
> often compared to some Indian or eastern traditions. It is only in
> Occident that monistic immaterial monism is so rare. But it "sleeps"
> in the Kaballah and in the Sufism. The problem is that most mystical
> researchers where just persecuted, so they developed ways to hide the
> doctrine which has lead to esoterism and, alas, to idolatry and
> supersitition. A traditional failure of theology which already
> appeared with Pythagorus.
> Greeks were really "rational". They didn't put the mystical insight
> under the rug. But all those who like to use authoritative arguments
> fears the mystical side, because it is a side allergic to
> authoritative arguments.
> The math part exemplifies in a third person very transparent way that
> mystical dimension of the universal machine(s). It shows that the
> universal numbers are necessarily partially analytical and partially
> mystical. This is the main quasi-obvious consequences of the splitting
> between G (the self-referentially prouvable) and G* (the truth about
> the "self-referentialy provable", even when not provable, but still
> questionable). Consciousness is already a mystical state, just that
> most of us are blasé about it!
> Gödel did not just prove the limitation of the machine/theories, he
> discovered also that machine/theories can discovered their own
> limitations, including their necessary and possible geometries/
> topologies, and then transform themselves.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -
> - Show quoted text -
Thanks for the interesting reply
Give me some time to have a think about your comments.
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