On 14 Apr 2011, at 22:25, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

This week in Die Zeit there were two papers about love and fidelity. One more scientific, another more philosophic. In the latter there is a couple of paragraphs related to Goethe’s “Elective Affinities” that are 100% in agreement with Rex:

Die Utopie der Liebe


"Fidelity is mere an idea that fails due to the natural laws. The materialistic calculation that Goethe has reviewed in a sharp game becomes clear in a remark by the captain, with whom Charlotte felt reluctant in love: “Think of an A that is intimately connected with a B, such that one cannot separate them without violence; think of a C that is connected in a similar way with a D; now bring the two couples in touch: A goes to D, C goes ​​to B, without that one can say who first left, who first joined the other.“

"So it happens. And is it not devilish near to a common way of thinking? The fact that we are not masters of our decisions, but products of biochemical processes (or some others)?"

Hence Rex might well be right that the discussion here continues because we do not have free will.

This shows only that we don't have free-will in the absolute incompatibilist sense, but there are compatibilist theories, which explains well the correctness of a relative (to the subject) incompatibilist feature of free will.

Critics of free-will are based on error confusion level. I think it is a bit dangerous, especially that there is already a social tendency to dissolve responsibility among those taking decisions. We are just not living at the level were we are determined. If we were, we could replace jail by hospital, and people would feel having the right to justify any act by uncontrollable pulsions. This leads to person and conscience eliminativism.



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