On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Breuno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?


It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM is a universal theory.

The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.

But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit like the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We can't contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory with many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.

In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.

With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and a complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the origin of the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the qualia).

To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more complex for unclear reason.

But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails the possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, just a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent.

My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend this is obvious.

I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.

Bruno



Richard

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Richard,

On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno,

If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible worlds?
Richard Ruquist

Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in W and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. Both happenings will happen, if I can say.

You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication + killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that you can influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible as suppressing the existence of a number. So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the cosmic consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or has to be both.

Bruno







On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:

Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

(JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and stochastic is sort of a random. ..."

BM: Not necessarily. Why not free-up your mind to think wider and include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result of ignorance of some deeper level?

OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self- duplication gives an example of abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic behavior).

In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level computations) are random.

This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a consequence of unitary evolution of the wf. It is curious that the deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of conscious experience.

This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp. Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious in digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails first person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), first person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials non cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity of digital physics a priori).

It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it should if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already there, because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is indeed a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps not confirmed by QM!).

Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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