Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and
starting (JM):
John

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
>  On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>  Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to
> suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "
>
> Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?
>
>
>
> It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the
> computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that
> QM is a universal theory.
>
            *(JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false
and QM being-NOT-                     a universal  theory?*

>
> The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and
> nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum
> mechanics, nor by digital mechanism.
>
            * (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an
'observer' reaistic as thought?*

>
> But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit like
> the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We can't
> contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory with
> many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.
>         *(JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame was
> 'created???*
> In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.
>         *(JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the
> future*.
>
  With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of
> consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and
> a complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the
> origin of the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the
> qualia).
>
> To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other
> computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more
> complex for unclear reason.
>
> But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is true, it
> has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails the
> possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, just
> a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent.
>
            * (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom.*

>
>


>  My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN physics
> is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend this
> is obvious.
>
> I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, the
> hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.
>
> Bruno
>
             *(John)*

>
>
>
>  Richard
>
> On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> Richard,
>>
>>  On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>>  Bruno,
>>
>> If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
>> could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible
>> worlds?
>> Richard Ruquist
>>
>>
>> Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in W
>> and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. Both
>> happenings will happen, if I can say.
>>
>> You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication +
>>  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done
>> in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane
>> for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the
>> MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that
>> you can influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to
>> consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse
>> (like with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the
>> existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible
>> as suppressing the existence of a number.
>> So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the cosmic
>> consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or has
>> to be both.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
>>>>>>
>>>>>>                  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know",
>>>>>> Chaos is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a 
>>>>>> random.
>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and
>>>>>> include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the 
>>>>>> result of
>>>>>> ignorance of some deeper level?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a
>>>>> perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of
>>>>> determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the
>>>>> iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly
>>>>> duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like
>>>>> WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible
>>>>> experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of
>>>>> abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic
>>>>> behavior).
>>>>>
>>>>> In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the
>>>>> most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our
>>>>> computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level
>>>>> computations) are random.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a
>>>> consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the
>>>> deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of
>>>> conscious experience.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through
>>> self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
>>> Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital
>>> mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious in
>>> digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails first
>>> person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), first
>>> person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials
>>> non cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity
>>> of digital physics a priori).
>>>
>>> It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it should
>>> if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already there,
>>> because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is indeed
>>> a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom
>>> physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot
>>> be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps
>>> not confirmed by QM!).
>>>
>>> Bruno Marchal
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
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