From: Russell Standish 
Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2011 6:14 PM
Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing
On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 05:20:24PM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russell,
>     But does this only make the problem worse? The quantity of
> information that would have to be specified in analogue recordings
> would be at least some power greater than the information necessary to
> specify the finite bit digital version! 

I don't think the information content of an analogue recording is even
well defined, without specifying a coarse graining. But I don't see
how that is related to the Maudlin / Movie Graph argument. I'm open to
be convinced otherwise, though.

    I am trying to better understand the relationship between the information 
content of a simulation and the computational resources required to “run” the 
simulation to see if there is a way to define a relative measure of how much 
one computational system can be said to be equivalent to another. The idea is 
that if two observers have the exact same simulations ‘running in their heads’ 
by comparing answers to questions put to them by some interviewer (Bruno’s 
idea!) then we can say that they are 1p bisimilar 
(, but since we do not have access to 
1p knowledge directly of someone other than oneself, could there be a 3p way to 
at least determine a bound within which the simulations can be said to not go. 
Basically I am looking to see if there is a ‘coherent’ physicalist version of  
David Deutsch’s Cantgotu idea. Reference: “The Simulation 
Argument and Implications for Reality” thread and the work of Carlton M. Caves
    My process dualism idea seems to require that such exists and so if there 
is proof that it cannot exist then my crazy idea is falsified or not even 
wrong. If there is a finite constraint on the Stone space that is the dual to a 
Boolean algebra and if this constraint hold in the cases of more general 
logical algebras and their Stone duals, then the constraint would have a 
particular “signature” or feature on the logical algebraic structure. So far 
the relationships hold in infinite logics (such as in the Gel’fand duality) but 
I have not seen any one considering the finitesimal case (except for the 
constructivists). If only I could get more information on non-principle ultra 
filters... /poke William

>I would like to be wrong on this, but ISTM that the Newtonian picture of the 
>universe demands infinite computational resources to implement the Laplace 
>Demon. I am trying to make sense of the Bekenstein bound and an idea in resent 
>discussion by > David Deutsch in his On Optimism speech – a speech that I wish 
>all persons would watch and comprehend.
>     I do overthink things. My lovely and brilliant wife often points this out 
> to me. 


> Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an “observer 
> moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious experience” related 
> to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM that both act like the idea of 
> a coarse graining on > an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a 
> system in that all of the members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable 
> from a macroscopic point of view. Related to this see: 
> and 
> . In our search to define a generic 
> non-anthropocentric notion of an observer, I think that this notion of a 
> lower bound on observable differences may help us see a better outline of the 
> idea that we are looking for.

It could be. Maybe Bruno has an opinion. ISTM that transformations of
implementations that leave observer moments invariant must be below
the substitution level, so you're probably on the right track here.

    I am very interested in Bruno’s comment on this! I apologize to all members 
that are confused by my posts,  it is very frustrating that there is no 
informal way to discuss this concept that I am studying. I simply do not “think 
in symbolic”. My thoughts are more like visual/proprioceptive sensations, the 
blessing and curse of dyslexia. 

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