From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Friday, April 29, 2011 11:45 AM To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing
On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote: Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an “observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a coarse graining on an ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system in that all of the members of the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view. You can easily relate them. Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are experiences of an individual when his brain is in some computational state S. We assume comp, of course, so we can attribute a 1-OM to some such state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computational states S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. For example the state of your brain emulated by a program computing the Heisenberg evolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, or the state of your brain obtained by another program simulating the quantum fluctuation of the void, or the state of your brain obtained by a fortran program emulating a lisp program emulating a prolog program emulating ... emulating the search of the solution of some universal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs are emulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces of computations obtained by such emulation can be proved to exist in a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite piece of computations, and they are all "run" by the UD. The first person glue them into a priori 2^aleph_0 infinite computations. For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a computation which is more fine grained. But you, by the first person indeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are. Actually you can be said belonging to all of them, and your physical laws are determined by the measure on your continuations of such computations. From this you can see that the highest level of substitution defines the measure on the possible lowest one, which you cannot distinguish, by definition. That is why, if we look at ourselves below that level, we have to be confronted with a strong form of indeterminacy. Boltzman's idea cannot be used at this stage, though, without having a measure on the relative computations, and this prevents a direct use of the notion of entropy. We need more physics for that, but, as I have already explained we have to derive that physics from the numbers and self-reference if we don't want to miss the relationship between the quanta and the qualia offered by the splitting between provable self-reference and true self-reference (G and G* and their intensional variants). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [SPK] Thank you very much for this comment. I have two comments in response: 1) Does not this relation, between substitution level and distinguishability level, hinge on the ability of a generic observer to make the distinction between what it is experiencing as opposed to and contrasted from what it is not (which is then defined as an 1-OM)? Is not the act of making a distinction a dynamic action that cannot be reduced to a static relation? I strongly believe that we do not have a solution of the hard problem of consciousness because we refuse to see the obvious fact that consciousness is not a static condition. Simply embedding a self-map within a static bit-string (via abstract Gödelization) is insufficient for reasons that Russell discusses in Theory of Nothing (the TIME postulate). Consciousness requires a flow to allow for a continuous updating of the self-mapping (modelizing) that is irreducible to a unique monotonic function for similar reasons that a machine can never know exactly what process it is supervening upon! What I am saying is that you are repeatedly stated this fact but it seems that you do not see the meaning of the words! At some point in these discussion we will have to come to grips with this property of observers: the ability to distinguish dynamically. I think that the results of the act of making distinctions (X) are the logical structures (G and G*) that you have explored in depth, but implies a X causes (G, G*) relation that is asymmetric for it tells us that G, G* supervene on X. How please note that X is, in my thinking, a process, not a static structure. My belief is that even with an ensemble of static structures does not equal a dynamic process. There must exist something that “breaths fire” into the ensemble. 2) You have discussed how the UD runs on something, but I have never been able to put my mental finger on what it is. Even after reading SANE04 several times and asking many questions on this List... Every time that I see a discussion that makes sense of the UD as a process that can be associated with something that is a process, like a concrete or physical universe, that connects to observable phenomena like thermodynamics, you make this claim (or equivalent) that “comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the physical processing related to the computations corresponding (with comp) to those experiences.” You seem to demand that since there does not exist a bijective (one to one and onto) map between a particular inner experience (1-OM) and some (particular thermodynamic law compliant) process X that can act as a concrete instantiation of some computation S, that X does not exist. Is this correct? It is an oxymoron to say that the UD “runs on the walls of Platonia” when we have explicitly forbidden Platonia from having anything like walls! Ideas require concrete implementations to be “real”. The idea (the philosophic aspect at least) that I am exploring is exactly related to the “physics” that we need to recover something consistent with Boltzman’s idea but so far it requires that the measure is emergent from interactions between 1-OMs in a way that is not static and timeless. To do this we need a notion of concurrency and some notion of time (not the sequence of events notion of time, but the flow of one event into another). Now, I agree with you that there can be no ontologically primitive time because as there cannot be a single monotonic universal ordering of events when those events include even just those for all possible OM. OTOH, there can exist a fundamental notion of change that can have aspects (projections?) in finite 1-OMs that when counted with some form of local measure will generate a local clock aspect of time. See: http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0212092 My only difficulty with your ideas is that you use the semantics of Becoming to argue for its antithesis. Why do you do this? What is your motivation? Is it your goal to prove the existence of a universal measure for all OMs? Why is not a local relative (not global or universal) measure not sufficient? Pratt’s residuation can be used to define the logical abstract aspect of such a local measure but his idea has not been fleshed out sufficiently to derive the particular form of this local measure, but other people are working on equivalent ideas that may overcome this shortcoming. Onward! Stephen PS, to Russell: I think that you are conflating consciousness with self-awareness in section 9.5 of your book. The two are not the same thing. Consciousness is purely passive. Self-awareness is active in that is involves the continuous modeling (passive consciousness) with the continuous act of choosing between alternatives (free will). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.