On 01 May 2011, at 16:08, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

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I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classicalpicture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notionthat you need to look at a sequence of states. But this iscompletely false. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, butclassicality from quantum dynamics is only achived because ofdecoherence, so the brain gets entangled with the environment. Thesame is true, of course, if you run any classical machine, like yourPC.Now, the computational state of your brain, represented as anentangled state with the environment, can be written in thesuggestive form:sum over input of |input, corresponding output>In fact, the entire computational history will be present in thestate, as it exist at any moment.

`That makes sense. The same can be argued directly with comp. It`

`follows from the usual reasoning.`

This is why I think that in Bruno's program, which apart from thetechnical details, involves deriving physics from the theory ofcomputation, one can jump to quantum mechanics much morestraightforwardly.

`OK, but with the mind-body problem as motivation, we have to derive`

`physics from computation in a specific way, so as to be able to have`

`both the quanta and the qualia (and thus by using the self-reference`

`logics).`

Also, since decoherence happens in the position bases, one shouldbe able to derive space-time from first principles as well.

As we should!

Simply put, if you have well defined computational states, youshould get quantum mechanics plus general relativity free of charge.

Not free of electrical charge, I hope! Bruno

Saibal Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possibleconscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept ofsubstitution level? ISTM that both act like the idea of acoarse graining on an ensemble that is used to define theentropy of a system in that all of the members of the ensemblethat are indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.You can easily relate them.Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM areexperiences of an individual when his brain is in somecomputational state S.I have reservations about this casual identification of "observermoments" and "brain states". I can accept that a brain candigitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession ofstates. But I find it very doubtful that each state correspondsto different "thought" or "observation" much less conscious"thoughts".I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, withconsciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the wholestructure of the computations, notably through the measure space.Locally we can still associate consciousness with some openinterval, but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) tosomething much more sophisticated than a "sequence of states". Itis the counter-intuitive part of computationalism: the failure ofthe identity thesis.Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must berealized by many successive digital-brain states in terms ofwhich they overlap with other thoughts both temporally andspatially. So digitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousnessoccurs in discrete time slices.You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a littlebit on purpose, so as not being too much technical. With comp wecan associate a consciousness to a third person event (like "mysleeping friend"). But my friend's consciousness is realized onlythrough an infinity of number relations.BrunoBrentWe assume comp, of course, so we can attribute a 1-OM to somesuch state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalentcomputational states S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universaldovetailing. For example the state of your brain emulated by aprogram computing the Heisenberg evolution of the Milky Way atthe level of strings, or the state of your brain obtained byanother program simulating the quantum fluctuation of the void,or the state of your brain obtained by a fortran programemulating a lisp program emulating a prolog programemulating ... emulating the search of the solution of someuniversal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs areemulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite piecesof computations obtained by such emulation can be proved toexist in a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 suchfinite piece of computations, and they are all "run" by the UD.The first person glue them into a priori 2^aleph_0 infinitecomputations.For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic acomputation which is more fine grained. But you, by the firstperson indeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are.Actually you can be said belonging to all of them, and yourphysical laws are determined by the measure on yourcontinuations of such computations. From this you can see thatthe highest level of substitution defines the measure on thepossible lowest one, which you cannot distinguish, bydefinition. That is why, if we look at ourselves below thatlevel, we have to be confronted with a strong form ofindeterminacy. Boltzman's idea cannot be used at this stage,though, without having a measure on the relative computations,and this prevents a direct use of the notion of entropy. We needmore physics for that, but, as I have already explained we haveto derive that physics from the numbers and self- reference if wedon't want to miss the relationship between the quanta and thequalia offered by the splitting between provable self-referenceand true self-reference (G and G* and their intensional variants).Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to theGoogle Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to theGoogle Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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