Hi Bruno and Saibal, 

    I agree with both of you. I would only caution against conflating the 
observer with the observed. We still need to show how we can get diffeomorphism 
invariance from OMs. I think I how how but do not know the math well enough.

Onward!

Stephen


From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2011 12:55 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Reading The Theory of Nothing

On 01 May 2011, at 16:08, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

> I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classical  
> picture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion  
> that you need to look at a sequence of states. But this is  
> completely false. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but  
> classicality from quantum dynamics is only achived because of  
> decoherence, so the brain gets entangled with the environment. The  
> same is true, of course, if you run any classical machine, like your  
> PC.
>
> Now, the computational state of your brain, represented  as an  
> entangled state with the environment, can be written in the  
> suggestive form:
>
> sum over input of |input, corresponding output>
>
> In fact, the entire computational history will be present in the  
> state, as it exist at any moment.

That makes sense. The same can be argued directly with comp. It  
follows from the usual reasoning.



>
>
> This is why I think that in Bruno's program, which apart from the  
> technical details, involves deriving physics from the theory of  
> computation, one can jump to quantum mechanics much more  
> straightforwardly.

OK, but with the mind-body problem as motivation, we have to derive  
physics from computation in a specific way, so as to be able to have  
both the quanta and the qualia (and thus by using the self-reference  
logics).



> Also, since decoherence happens in the position bases, one should   
> be able to derive space-time from first principles as well.

As we should!



> Simply put, if you have well defined computational states, you  
> should get quantum mechanics plus general relativity free of charge.

Not free of electrical charge, I hope!

Bruno


>
> Saibal
>
> Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
>
>>
>> On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an   
>>>>>> “observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible   
>>>>>> conscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of  
>>>>>> substitution  level? ISTM that both act like the idea of a  
>>>>>> coarse graining on  an ensemble that is used to define the  
>>>>>> entropy of a system in  that all of the members of the ensemble  
>>>>>> that are  indistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.
>>>>
>>>> You can easily relate them.
>>>>
>>>> Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are   
>>>> experiences of an individual when his brain is in some   
>>>> computational state S.
>>>
>>> I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer   
>>> moments" and "brain states".  I can accept that a brain can   
>>> digitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession of   
>>> states.  But I find it very doubtful that each state corresponds  
>>> to  different "thought" or "observation" much less conscious  
>>> "thoughts".
>>
>> I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, with   
>> consciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the whole   
>> structure of the computations, notably through the measure space.   
>> Locally we can still associate consciousness with some open  
>> interval,  but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) to  
>> something much more  sophisticated than a "sequence of states". It  
>> is the counter-intuitive  part of computationalism: the failure of  
>> the identity thesis.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must be   
>>> realized by many successive digital-brain states in terms of  
>>> which  they overlap with other thoughts both temporally and  
>>> spatially.  So  digitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousness  
>>> occurs in  discrete time slices.
>>
>> You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a little  
>> bit  on purpose, so as not being too much technical. With comp we  
>> can  associate a consciousness to a third person event (like "my  
>> sleeping  friend"). But my friend's consciousness is realized only  
>> through an  infinity of number relations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>> We assume comp, of course,  so we can attribute a 1-OM to some  
>>>> such  state. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent  
>>>> computational  states S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal  
>>>> dovetailing. For  example the state of your brain emulated by a  
>>>> program computing the  Heisenberg evolution of the Milky Way at  
>>>> the level of strings, or  the state of your brain obtained by  
>>>> another program simulating the  quantum fluctuation of the void,  
>>>> or the state of your brain  obtained by a fortran program  
>>>> emulating a lisp program emulating a  prolog program  
>>>> emulating ... emulating the search of the solution  of some  
>>>> universal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs  are  
>>>> emulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces   
>>>> of computations obtained by such emulation can be proved to  
>>>> exist  in a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such  
>>>> finite piece  of computations, and they are all "run" by the UD.  
>>>> The first person  glue them into a priori 2^aleph_0 infinite  
>>>> computations.
>>>> For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a  
>>>> computation  which is more fine grained. But you, by the first  
>>>> person  indeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are.  
>>>> Actually  you can be said belonging to all of them, and your  
>>>> physical laws  are determined by the measure on your  
>>>> continuations of such  computations. From this you can see that  
>>>> the highest level of  substitution defines the measure on the  
>>>> possible lowest one, which  you cannot distinguish, by  
>>>> definition. That is why, if we look at  ourselves below that  
>>>> level, we have to be confronted with a strong  form of  
>>>> indeterminacy. Boltzman's idea cannot be used at this  stage,  
>>>> though, without having a measure on the relative  computations,  
>>>> and this prevents a direct use of the notion of  entropy. We need  
>>>> more physics for that, but, as I have already  explained we have  
>>>> to derive that physics from the numbers and self- reference if we  
>>>> don't want to miss the relationship between the  quanta and the  
>>>> qualia offered by the splitting between provable  self-reference  
>>>> and true self-reference (G and G* and their  intensional variants).
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
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