Hi John,

    I love your comments!!!!!

Onward!

Stephen

From: John Mikes 
Sent: Sunday, May 01, 2011 4:05 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Love and Free Will
Dear Bruno and Brent:
(not quite sure which 'open' par belongs to whom, since they are open in 
Bruno's text as well as in Brent's - but that is irrelevant at this moment: I 
don't intend to "argue")
I thank you for reflecting to my scribblings in a very professional spirit. I 
apologize for boring you by remarks (questions) derived from a different 
worldview (and vocabulary) from what you apply. I decided several times NOT to 
barge in, yet am fallible and in-disciplined. Sorry. 

To Bruno's "they work well": I use 'almost' because of flaws that occur 
occasionally.
Reason in my view: our so far learned (you may call it: observable, see below) 
'world' is a portion of the wholeness and the entire totality is in relational 
exchange with everything - including those items we already know about. The 
rest of the interference is 'surprising' (i.e. out of our rulely - knowable 
expectations: considerable as flaws). 
Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational connection 
with anything else,  not restricted to 'conscious' (horribile dictu: "human"?) 
observers. So I would not call 'it' a "he". My question was: can a mental 
object (thought?) be observing in my sense? (That would be an extension to a 
'physical' view). 

I appreciate Brent's remark restricting the collapse etc. as part of the 
"DESCRIPTION".

And I loved the sweet fairy-tale: 
"God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for him 
just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)"  by the bearded supernatural inventor, way 
before it was applicable to human-identified time concept. Thank you. 

Insanity: what is sanity?

I admit that your (and Brent's etc.) positions are the best available and 
decent, I am stubborn (maybe I learnt insufficient math-physics to join the 
choir) but look now from a perspective above my head into an unlimited 
complexity from which certain 'aspects' (maybe derived by the actual state of 
our understanding only) are composed into limited models for ourselves to think 
WITHIN. That is our perceived reality (just a word) and subject to relations 
from yonder. 
Your boss, the universal machine (yes, it is feminine in French, Latin and 
German) is THERE, beyond my imagination and I don't force my flimsy mind to 
identify it in MY terms. She may be more than I can fathom. So I sit in my own 
schizophrenia: live in a restricted pool of ideas and think about an 
unrestricted everything beyond my capabilities. 
I don't want to compromise, nor to accept what seems incomplete. 

I hope to bother you less with my nightmares in the future (but don't count on 
it). . 

John M
 


On Fri, Apr 29, 2011 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

  On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
    Hi John, 


    On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote:


      Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and 
starting (JM):
      John


      On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


        On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote:


          Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to 
suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

          Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?


        It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent  with the 
computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that QM 
is a universal theory.
                  (JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false 
and QM being-NOT-a universal  theory?

    In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and another 
theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, especially together, and 
the more we study them, the more astonishing they look. I like them, because I 
like to surprises. I like theories which shake my prejudices.







        The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century 
and nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum 
mechanics, nor by digital mechanism. 
                  (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an 
'observer' reaistic as thought?

    A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave 
function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or logic. 
Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the objects of his 
study. The observer does not need a special status, he belongs to the world he 
is observing. 


  Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g. Bohr's

  http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.4072v1.pdf

  and more recently Asher Peres

  http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9711/9711003v1.pdf

  The "collapse" of the wave function is easily explained as an epistemic event 
in one's description of the system.

  Brent 




    With comp also. This allows monism: the researcher is embedded in the field 
that he searches. No need of a cut between subject and object. No need for an 
ontological dualism.





        But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit 
like the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We 
can't contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory 
with many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc.
                (JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame 
was 'created???


    God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for 
him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)




        In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties.
                (JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the 
future. 


    We can, accepting a theory. With comp we can explain that science will 
never know for sure, and that knowing anything for sure, except one own 
consciousness, is a case of insanity. 
    Of course comp might be false, in which case you might be right. Note also 
that there are many futures, both on the first person plane (hell, heaven, the 
Tibetan intermediate realms, etc.) and on the third person plane, as described 
by the wave function. All this by *conjecturing* comp and/or QM. 





        With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of 
consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and a 
complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the origin of 
the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the qualia).

        To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other 
computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more 
complex for unclear reason.

        But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is 
true, it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails 
the possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, 
just a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent.
                  (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom.

    You can thank the universal machine. I am just her messenger ;)




                            


        My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN 
physics is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend 
this is obvious.

        I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, 
the hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences.

        Bruno
                   (John)

    Have a good day, John,

    Bruno









          Richard


          On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> 
wrote:

            Richard, 

            On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:


              Bruno,

              If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices, 
              could not it choose to select a single world from the many 
possible worlds?
              Richard Ruquist


            Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted 
in W and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. 
Both happenings will happen, if I can say.

            You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication 
+  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done 
in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane for 
W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the MW, 
through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that you can 
influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to 
consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like 
with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the existence of 
computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible as suppressing 
the existence of a number.
            So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the 
cosmic consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or 
has to be both.

            Bruno








              On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal 
<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


                On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:


                  On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



                    On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:


                      Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):

                                       (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I 
don't know", Chaos is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of 
a random. ..."

                      BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think 
wider and include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the 
result of ignorance of some deeper level?


                    OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with 
Brent, and a perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct 
consequence of determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated 
by the iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly 
duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like 
WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible experience, 
in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of abrupt 
indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic behavior).

                    In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy 
confirms one of the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we 
look below our computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our 
sub-level computations) are random.


                  This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in 
turn is a consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the 
deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of 
conscious experience.


                This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, 
through self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
                Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of 
digital mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious 
in digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails first 
person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), first 
person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials non 
cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity of 
digital physics a priori).

                It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as 
it should if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already 
there, because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is 
indeed a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom 
physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot be 
cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps not 
confirmed by QM!).

                Bruno Marchal

                http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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