On 5/1/2011 3:23 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
It does not exist "ontologically", but still exist (and is
unavoidable) epistemologically. X can exist, but the UDA shows that it
would be without any explanatory purpose: we cannot attach
consciousness to it, so we have no choice, for explaining the
appearance of X, to "reduce" it to number relations. The
self-reference logics show that such an enterprise makes sense. And
from this we get a coherent, conceptually simple, theory of both
quanta and qualia. It is as close as it is possible to a solution of
the "hard problem of consciousness" (that is the mind-body problem).
[SPK] You define existence in a way that is very different from how I
define it. For me “to exist” is a pure ontological 3p. I consider
existence as purely possible necessity. This makes any epistemological
existence supervenient upon its possible necessity in the ontological
sense. “To exist” is distinct from “to be manifest” or “to be
knowable” or “to be provable” or any other 1p predication.
First we have experiences and then we make a model of what exists.
Epistemology precedes ontology.
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