On 5/1/2011 3:23 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
It does not exist "ontologically", but still exist (and is unavoidable) epistemologically. X can exist, but the UDA shows that it would be without any explanatory purpose: we cannot attach consciousness to it, so we have no choice, for explaining the appearance of X, to "reduce" it to number relations. The self-reference logics show that such an enterprise makes sense. And from this we get a coherent, conceptually simple, theory of both quanta and qualia. It is as close as it is possible to a solution of the "hard problem of consciousness" (that is the mind-body problem). [SPK] You define existence in a way that is very different from how I define it. For me “to exist” is a pure ontological 3p. I consider existence as purely possible necessity. This makes any epistemological existence supervenient upon its possible necessity in the ontological sense. “To exist” is distinct from “to be manifest” or “to be knowable” or “to be provable” or any other 1p predication.

First we have experiences and then we make a model of what exists. Epistemology precedes ontology.


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