On Mon, May 09, 2011 at 01:35:10AM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> 
>     Is not the SSA “the idea that you should reason as if you were a
random sample form the set of all observers" . 

Yes.

> I do seem to be rehashing some of Mallah’s argument
  (http://www.higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm ) but even in your reply to
  Mallah you use  the notion of “mean human lifetime”. How is this a
  known quantity unless one takes an atemporal “block universe” stance
  and excludes possible life extension technologies, etc. Exactly what
  does “the set of all observers” mean otherwise?

It probably wouldn't matter much to the argument if we do include all
possible life extension technologies, provided the mean
human lifetime was finite, and not too different to what we
observe. Of course that places interesting constraints on the form of
life extension technologies, that would be of interest to the transhumanists.

>     There is some interesting discussion over at 
> http://www.kurzweilai.net/forums/topic/indexical-information-destructive-brain-copying-revisited
> 

Indeed. We had quite a bit of discussion on indexical arguments on the
everything list as well. I'm afraid its all a bit much for me to
digest in one gulp, though...

> Onward!
> 
> Stephen
> 
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