On 09 May 2011, at 04:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Hi Russell, Did you see the rest of that post? How does my sketch (replicated here) work out as a probability?“ My parents lived in a certain area when this body that Iassociate with was born, their respective parents lived in Texas andMain, etc. This location, while subject to indeterminacy via Bruno’steleportation/copying argument, does seem to at least partiallyaddress the question of “why do I find myself in a particular place,time, body, etc.?” So maybe my difficulty is in understanding themotivation of the DA and this in turn makes me less than sanguineabout the “Ants are not conscious” argument. I worry that we aremisapplying our knowledge of the mathematics of statistics to morphthe Hard Problem into a problem of measure.I think that the ‘Surprise 20 Questions’ idea that John Wheelerconsidered in his famous ‘It from Bit’ paper might be moreappropriate. Any OM that is a possible continuance of another OMmust not contain information that is inconsistent with any previousOM in its sequence, up to some constant that relates to the upperbound on the resolving power of a typical measurement. Weadditionally need to consider that possible interactions betweenphysical systems would also constrain the information in the OMssuch that no OM in a sequence could contain information thatcontradicts that of another that is related to some separate but co-existing system.Instead of thinking of the content of OMs in terms of somestatistical measure, I think that it might be a better idea toconsider exactly how OM are sequenced together such that the WhiteRabbit problem is minimized. This method is what Pratt uses in hisresiduation idea in his process dualism solution to the concurrencyproblem, where each state/event transition occurs so long as bothphysical conservation laws and logical non-contradiction laws areupheld. It seems to me that this bypasses the measure problemcompletely.”From what I can tell, the probability would be 1 if the quantityof look-back for “consistency of the next state” requirement (for achaining of OMs) that goes to the event horizon of the Big bang...The idea is that any new OM to be added to the sequence can only beone that is consistent with all the prior OMs. This automaticallyreduces if not eliminates the White Rabbit problem!

`Not at all. Dreams illustrates that consistency is too cheap a priori`

`for that. Truth, instead of consistency, could reduce the WR problem,`

`but comp prevents its use. The consistency (Dt) is needed (like in Bp`

`& Dt), and is the base of the mathematical formulation of the measure`

`problem in the self-reference logic. BY Gödel's compeletness theorem,`

`consistency requirement is equivalent with the no cul-de-sac assumption.`

Bruno

To address your question directly: The SSA seems to assume (andmaybe even require!) an eternalist based notion of an ensemble ofOMs, that all of its members exist simultaneously, such that therandom sample is distributed evenly over all of its members. This,as far as I can tell, eliminated the possibility of taking intoconsideration who my parents might be, but it does so by tacitlyassuming that simultaneous existence of the members of the ensemble.I see this as equivalent to postulating an absolute observer outsideof a block universe that can count all of the humans.If we apply a similar structured reasoning about consciousness,it makes sense that we would arrive at the conclusion that self-awareness is required for consciousness to exist! This happen, Ithink, because of the external observer implication! Such anexternal observer would be one that could formulate the “I think,therefor I am” predicate for itself and thus be self-aware per thatpredication: I believe that “I think that I exist” and its thoughtthat “I exist” is true. This is fancy but smells fallacious. Anyargument that requires, tacitly or explicitly, the existence of anexternal observer of the system or ensemble or whatever cannot beused to define the properties of consciousness unless we are goingto admit an anti-foundation axiom. I advocate the AF axiom for otherreasons...I favor a non-eternalist notion when it comes to considerationsof OM sequencing for this reason. I assumed (silly me!) that youwould take the implications of your TIME postulate as a reasoningagainst the eternalist aspect of the SSA’s ensemble: “Time is whatprevents everything from happening at once” (J.A. Wheeler). Myreading of various papers on the concurrency problem and the problemof time in Quantum gravity leads me to the form: “Time existsbecause everything cannot happen at at once”, a bit different fromWheeler’s version. We cannot simultaneously measure non-commutingobservables plus that impossibility of synchronizing large networksgiven a finite signal propagation plus the P =/= NP assumption plusthe computational intractability of simulating arbitrarily preciselyphysical systems are some of the reasons.Onward! Stephen From: Russell Standish Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 6:27 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis On Sat, May 07, 2011 at 12:57:25AM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote: > HI Russell, > > I don’t get it! > Surely you can see that the original doomsday argument does not depend on details of who your parents might be? Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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