On 07 May 2011, at 19:36, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/7/2011 8:19 AM, John Mikes wrote:
I am gladly standing corrected about our fellow smart animals.
We speak about a "self-awareness" as we, humans identify it in our
human terms and views.
Maybe other animals have different mental capabilities we cannot
pursue or understand, as adjusted to their level of complexity
usable in their 'menatality'. It may - or may not - be only
according to their number of neurons as our conventional sciences
teach. Or some may use senses we are deficient in, maybe totally
ignorant about. (We have a deficient smelling sense as compared to
a dog and missing orientation's senses of some birds, fish, turtle)
In our anthropocentric boasting we believe that only our human
observations are 'real'.
Thanks for setting me straight
Not only do other species have different perceptual modalities; even
within the "self-awareness" there are different kinds. Referring to
my favorite example of the AI Mars rover, such a rover has awareness
of it's position on the planet. It has awareness of it's battery
charge and the functionality of various subsystems. It has
awareness of its immediate goal (climb over that hill) and of some
longer mission (proceed to the gully and take a soil sample). It's
not aware of where these goals arise (as humans are not aware of why
they fall in love). It's not aware of it's origins or
construction. It's not a social creature, so it's not aware of it's
position in a society or of what others may think of it.
I expect that when we have understood consciousness we will see that
it is a complex of many things, just as when we came to understand
life we found that it is a complex of many different processes.
Life and consciousness are different notion with respect to the notion
of explanation we can find from them. In case of life, we can reduce a
third person describable phenomenon to another one (for example we can
argue that biology is in principle reduced to chemistry, which is
reduced to physics). For consciousness there is an hard problem, which
is the mind-body problem, and most people working on the subject agree
that it needs another sort of explanation. Then comp shows that
indeed, part of that problem, is that if we use the "traditional"
mechanistic rationale, we inherit the need of reducing physics to
number theory and intensional number theory, with a need to explicitly
distinguish first person and third person distinction. In a sense, the
"hard problem" of consciousness leads to an "hard problem of
matter" (the first person measure problem). Of course, I do think that
mathematical logic put much light on all of this, especially the self-
reference logics. Indeed, it makes the problem a purely mathematical
problem, and it shows quanta to be a particular case of qualia. So we
can say that comp has already solved the conceptual problem of the
origin of the coupling consciousness/matter, unless someone can shows
that too much white rabbits remains predictible and that normalization
of them is impossible, in which case comp is refuted.
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