Dear Bruno,

    But this is problematic since dreams are 3p describable by the diary 
method, in that I usually have some memory of what I was dreaming once I awake 
that I can encode in using symbols for communications to others. It could be 
that the reported difficulty of becoming aware of the truth that one is 
dreaming, while one is in fact dreaming, is an answer. How would we formulated 
this in your modal logic?
    The difficulty I see in your reasoning is that Truth seems to require 
omniscience. Please elaborate on your point some more.

Onward!

Stephen

From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 4:15 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis

On 09 May 2011, at 04:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:


  Hi Russell,

      Did you see the rest of that post? 

      How does my sketch (replicated here) work out as a probability? 
      
      “ My parents lived in a certain area when this body that I associate with 
was born, their respective parents lived in Texas and Main, etc. This location, 
while subject to indeterminacy via Bruno’s teleportation/copying argument, does 
seem to at least partially address the question of “why do I find myself in a 
particular place, time, body, etc.?” So maybe my difficulty is in understanding 
the motivation of the DA and this in turn makes me less than sanguine about the 
“Ants are not conscious” argument. I worry that we are misapplying our 
knowledge of the mathematics of statistics to morph the Hard Problem into a 
problem of measure.
      I think that the ‘Surprise 20 Questions’ idea that John Wheeler 
considered in his famous ‘It from Bit’ paper might be more appropriate. Any OM 
that is a possible continuance of another OM must not contain information that 
is inconsistent with any previous OM in its sequence, up to some constant that 
relates to the upper bound on the resolving power of a typical measurement. We 
additionally need to consider that possible interactions between physical 
systems would also constrain the information in the OMs such that no OM in a 
sequence could contain information that contradicts that of another that is 
related to some separate but co-existing system.
      Instead of thinking of the content of OMs in terms of some statistical 
measure, I think that it might be a better idea to consider exactly how OM are 
sequenced together such that the White Rabbit problem is minimized. This method 
is what Pratt uses in his residuation idea in his process dualism solution to 
the concurrency problem, where each state/event transition occurs so long as 
both physical conservation laws and logical non-contradiction laws are upheld. 
It seems to me that this bypasses the measure problem completely.”
      From what I can tell, the probability would be 1 if the quantity of 
look-back for “consistency of the next state” requirement (for a chaining of 
OMs) that goes to the event horizon of the Big bang... The idea is that any new 
OM to be added to the sequence can only be one that is consistent with all the 
prior OMs. This automatically reduces if not eliminates the White Rabbit 
problem!

Not at all. Dreams illustrates that consistency is too cheap a priori for that. 
Truth, instead of consistency, could reduce the WR problem, but comp prevents 
its use. The consistency (Dt) is needed (like in Bp & Dt), and is the base of 
the mathematical formulation of the measure problem in the self-reference 
logic. BY Gödel's compeletness theorem, consistency requirement is equivalent 
with the no cul-de-sac assumption.


Bruno







      To address your question directly: The SSA seems to assume (and maybe 
even require!) an eternalist based notion of an ensemble of OMs, that all of 
its members exist simultaneously, such that the random sample is distributed 
evenly over all of its members. This, as far as I can tell, eliminated the 
possibility of taking into consideration who my parents might be, but it does 
so by tacitly assuming that simultaneous existence of the members of the 
ensemble. I see this as equivalent to postulating an absolute observer outside 
of a block universe that can count all of the humans. 
      If we apply a similar structured reasoning about consciousness, it makes 
sense that we would arrive at the conclusion that self-awareness is required 
for consciousness to exist! This happen, I think, because of the external 
observer implication! Such an external observer would be one that could 
formulate the “I think, therefor I am” predicate for itself and thus be 
self-aware per that predication: I believe that “I think that I exist” and its 
thought that “I exist” is true. This is fancy but smells fallacious. Any 
argument that requires, tacitly or explicitly, the existence of an external 
observer of the system or ensemble or whatever cannot be used to define the 
properties of consciousness unless we are going to admit an anti-foundation 
axiom. I advocate the AF axiom for other reasons...
      I favor a non-eternalist notion when it comes to considerations of OM 
sequencing for this reason. I assumed (silly me!) that you would take the 
implications of your TIME postulate as a reasoning against the eternalist 
aspect of the SSA’s ensemble: “Time is what prevents everything from happening 
at once” (J.A. Wheeler).  My reading of various papers on the concurrency 
problem and the problem of time in Quantum gravity leads me to the form: “Time 
exists because everything cannot happen at at once”, a bit different from 
Wheeler’s version. We cannot simultaneously measure non-commuting observables 
plus that impossibility of synchronizing large networks given a finite signal 
propagation plus the P =/= NP assumption plus the computational intractability 
of simulating arbitrarily precisely physical systems are some of the reasons.
  Onward!
  Stephen



  From: Russell Standish 
  Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 6:27 PM
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis
  On Sat, May 07, 2011 at 12:57:25AM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
  > HI Russell,
  >     
  >     I don’t get it! 
  > 

  Surely you can see that the original doomsday argument does not depend
  on details of who your parents might be?

  Cheers

  -- 

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