On 09 May 2011, at 13:35, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

But this is problematic since dreams are 3p describable by the diary method,


A part of it only. You can write "I am conscious", but that is not a communication, at least in the strong sense of persuading some others. Dream are typically first person experiences. Malcolm wrote different books arguing that machine cannot be conscious, and that ... dreams does not exist. He is quite rational and coherent, and arguments against mechanism are often argument against the possibility of dreaming. Dreams plays some role in UDA, although "video-game" can be used instead. Note that in the WM duplication experiment, the content of the diary is not communicable. "I am in W" does not convey a proof, as the guy in M can understand introspectively. Dreams, and 1p can be approximated by memory and diary content, and that might be enough in some part of some reasoning (like in the UDA), but those are only approximations.



in that I usually have some memory of what I was dreaming once I awake that I can encode in using symbols for communications to others. It could be that the reported difficulty of becoming aware of the truth that one is dreaming, while one is in fact dreaming, is an answer.

This is not so difficult. There are books explaining how to train oneself to become lucid in dreams. I don't see the relevance to the point, though.




How would we formulated this in your modal logic?

Bp v DDt (I suggest this in "conscience et mécanisme": it makes the Malcolm argument against comp and against dreams equivalent). Don't mind this too much.



The difficulty I see in your reasoning is that Truth seems to require omniscience.

In what sense?
What do you mean by omniscience? Do you mean the closure for the modus ponens rule (like in logic), or the God-like knowledge of everything, like in (pseudo) religion?



Please elaborate on your point some more.

All what I was saying is that the constrains of consistency does not eliminate the WR, *per se*. Truth would, but we cannot use it because a machine cannot distinguish truth and provability from its first person view, and we are trying to eliminate the first person White Rabbits. But then, the constraints of consistency, appears to be enough, thanks to the self-reference logics. The hypostases Bp & Dp (or Bp & Dt) does obey a kind of quantum logic, which might make the first person (plural) white rabbits vanishing away.

Bruno



From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 4:15 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis

On 09 May 2011, at 04:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Russell,

    Did you see the rest of that post?

    How does my sketch (replicated here) work out as a probability?

“ My parents lived in a certain area when this body that I associate with was born, their respective parents lived in Texas and Main, etc. This location, while subject to indeterminacy via Bruno’s teleportation/copying argument, does seem to at least partially address the question of “why do I find myself in a particular place, time, body, etc.?” So maybe my difficulty is in understanding the motivation of the DA and this in turn makes me less than sanguine about the “Ants are not conscious” argument. I worry that we are misapplying our knowledge of the mathematics of statistics to morph the Hard Problem into a problem of measure.

I think that the ‘Surprise 20 Questions’ idea that John Wheeler considered in his famous ‘It from Bit’ paper might be more appropriate. Any OM that is a possible continuance of another OM must not contain information that is inconsistent with any previous OM in its sequence, up to some constant that relates to the upper bound on the resolving power of a typical measurement. We additionally need to consider that possible interactions between physical systems would also constrain the information in the OMs such that no OM in a sequence could contain information that contradicts that of another that is related to some separate but co- existing system. Instead of thinking of the content of OMs in terms of some statistical measure, I think that it might be a better idea to consider exactly how OM are sequenced together such that the White Rabbit problem is minimized. This method is what Pratt uses in his residuation idea in his process dualism solution to the concurrency problem, where each state/event transition occurs so long as both physical conservation laws and logical non-contradiction laws are upheld. It seems to me that this bypasses the measure problem completely.”

From what I can tell, the probability would be 1 if the quantity of look-back for “consistency of the next state” requirement (for a chaining of OMs) that goes to the event horizon of the Big bang... The idea is that any new OM to be added to the sequence can only be one that is consistent with all the prior OMs. This automatically reduces if not eliminates the White Rabbit problem!

Not at all. Dreams illustrates that consistency is too cheap a priori for that. Truth, instead of consistency, could reduce the WR problem, but comp prevents its use. The consistency (Dt) is needed (like in Bp & Dt), and is the base of the mathematical formulation of the measure problem in the self-reference logic. BY Gödel's compeletness theorem, consistency requirement is equivalent with the no cul-de-sac assumption.


Bruno






To address your question directly: The SSA seems to assume (and maybe even require!) an eternalist based notion of an ensemble of OMs, that all of its members exist simultaneously, such that the random sample is distributed evenly over all of its members. This, as far as I can tell, eliminated the possibility of taking into consideration who my parents might be, but it does so by tacitly assuming that simultaneous existence of the members of the ensemble. I see this as equivalent to postulating an absolute observer outside of a block universe that can count all of the humans.

If we apply a similar structured reasoning about consciousness, it makes sense that we would arrive at the conclusion that self- awareness is required for consciousness to exist! This happen, I think, because of the external observer implication! Such an external observer would be one that could formulate the “I think, therefor I am” predicate for itself and thus be self-aware per that predication: I believe that “I think that I exist” and its thought that “I exist” is true. This is fancy but smells fallacious. Any argument that requires, tacitly or explicitly, the existence of an external observer of the system or ensemble or whatever cannot be used to define the properties of consciousness unless we are going to admit an anti-foundation axiom. I advocate the AF axiom for other reasons...

I favor a non-eternalist notion when it comes to considerations of OM sequencing for this reason. I assumed (silly me!) that you would take the implications of your TIME postulate as a reasoning against the eternalist aspect of the SSA’s ensemble: “Time is what prevents everything from happening at once” (J.A. Wheeler). My reading of various papers on the concurrency problem and the problem of time in Quantum gravity leads me to the form: “Time exists because everything cannot happen at at once”, a bit different from Wheeler’s version. We cannot simultaneously measure non-commuting observables plus that impossibility of synchronizing large networks given a finite signal propagation plus the P =/= NP assumption plus the computational intractability of simulating arbitrarily precisely physical systems are some of the reasons.
Onward!

Stephen



From: Russell Standish
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2011 6:27 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis
On Sat, May 07, 2011 at 12:57:25AM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> HI Russell,
>
>     I don’t get it!
>

Surely you can see that the original doomsday argument does not depend
on details of who your parents might be?

Cheers

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