On 09 May 2011, at 13:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Could you elaborate more on your statement? One reason that the
world is not thought to be Newtonian is that in a Newtonian universe
our atoms would not be stable. Max Planck was driven to postulate
his constant because Newtonian physics predicts an ultraviolet
catastrophe for the electromagnetic radiation emitted by a hot object.
Yes. the discovery of the quantum facts leads to the abandon of
Newtonian physics. More easily the Newtonian universe is incompatible
with digital mechanism. This should be obvious by the UDA, and I refer
you to it. Ask if you have a specific problem with some statement.
Note also that Newton was aware that Newtonian physics was
incompatible with some astronomical facts, and he was aware that his
physics was problematic with the behavior of light. In fact both
Newton and Huygens already point on facts which announce quantum
Does it matter that while dreaming all experiences, especially
those that involve the appearance of other persons is purely
solipsistic? In other words, When I dream, all that I could be aware
of is purely a product of my brain. Well, let me weaken that claim a
bit since it has been shown that noise and other stimuli in the
environment of the sleeper has some appreciable effects on dream
content, nevertheless the “what I am aware of” is clearly is not
determined by external states of affairs.
Malcolm, whoever that is..., is using the usual definition of
existence that I rail against as it is dependent of physical
instantiation, I am not sure that this would weaken his claims. But
dreams as computations within computations (ala video games) seems
unproblematic but it does not advance the discussion as far as I can
tell, but the issue of “diary contents are not communicable” seems
to weaken the argument for 1p indeterminism. I say this because
unless there is some means to communicate the subjective experiences
of our teleported and copied person to a witness that can compare
the state of “I am in Moscow” and “I am in Washington” how are we to
reason about the 1p of the person that is teleported?
It does not weaken the argument for indeterminacy. It just illustrates
that such an indeterminacy is 1p, and thus not communicable. It is
rather natural in a theory on consciousness, which is also not
We might be making a person into a zombie by teleporting them!
How could we know that we are not unless we can communicate the
content of the diary?
We cannot. That is why I insist so much that mechanism asks for an act
of faith, and belongs to (scientific) theology.
I cannot just blindly accept the postulate of physical supervenience
of subjective experience in this case since we do not have a clear
and falsifiable model of consciousness/qualia yet! (Well, other than
Never accept anything blindly. But then, as you say, comp is
I, personally, have been trying to lucid dream for a long time
and have not had any success at it, but I know people that report
that they can. I can only bet that it occurs as I do not have 1
person knowledge that it is true, but even if I did have a lucid
dream experience, how would I test to be sure that I am not
hallucinating that I am lucid?
You can't. A lucid dream is nothing more than a dream in which you
conclude that you are dreaming, but like for the awaken state, you can
never been 100% sure.
This is a bit of a fly paper that we can get stuck on! The point is
that dreamign seems to show a counter-example to the claim that
consciousness requires self-awareness. It is my claim that self-
awareness requires consciousness, but consciousness is a passive
property that all logics (that have stone duals) have.
(This claim is similar to Chalmer’s idea that consciousness is a
basic property like mass and charge.)
That needs a non-comp theory.
Self-awareness emerges from active updating self-modeling within and
between the logics and requires some form of evolution; it is
dependent on a “flow of time”.
All terms are too much ambiguous, and can be interpreted differently
with different assumptions.
What would be the English version of Bp v DDt ? Could you give us
an example of this?
It means that "either p is true in all accessible worlds or I can
access to a transitory world (a non cul-de-sac world)". In arithmetic,
it means that p is provable or it is consistent that I am consistent.
The link with lucidity is not obvious, and beyond the scope of this
What do you mean by omniscience? Do you mean the closure for the
modus ponens rule (like in logic), or the God-like knowledge of
everything, like in (pseudo) religion?
It is related to the closure issue for modus ponens in the sense
that the list of premises must be complete for the conclusion to be
certain truth, thus for a conclusion to be True in an absolute
sense, one must have an “omniscient list”.
This does not make sense for me.
This passage from the http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/
article is also related to my concerns:
This is rather good. Except for minor details.
It gives the reference to the Esakia paper I talked about, on the
topological interpretation of G (that he calls GL).
Sure, the consistency constraint would allow for WR so long as they
could be interpreted as hallucinations, noise, swamp gas, etc. So
long as there is a means to ‘explain away” the WR in the 3p case,
which is where we take into account the appearance of interactions
between “machines”, then my claim would hold. The idea is like that
in the Surprise 20 questions game, the sequential answers that any
1p would obtain of the states of affairs of the world that is
experienced could be stochastic or random sampling of an ensemble
(as in the SSA) but are constrained to not contradict any prior
This idea requires “book keeping'” and thus seems to require a
physical world to act as the persisting structure to record the past
states of observer moments. It is as the physical world that is the
“tape” for the UD in my thinking. OTOH, this “physical world” should
not be considered as an ontologically primitive as it too is,
ultimately, a fiction supervening on the bisimulations between
quantum systems. In my ontology only quantum systems (as stone
spaces) and their logics are primitive up to degeneracy in the limit
of the totality of existence, AKA Nothing (as in Bertrand Russell’s
neutral monism) .
You should expose your theory, once and for all. Then we can see if it
is coherent or not with the mechanist hypothesis. You make too much
unrelated precise statements so that I could comment them. It is too
much fuzzy, sorry.
To put this idea into mythological terms, I ask that we consider
that Creation of the Universe is an (ultimately eternal) ongoing
process instead of a Special one-time event. I see this idea as
consistent with the UD as per your discussions but it requires that
the UD not be reducible to some a priori existing and static
hypostase or number.
You seem to change your mind on this, a lot of time. But once we
assume mechanism, there are no more choice in the matter. The UD exist
like the number PI exist, and the flow of time exists in the mind of
the relative numbers. The universes don't appear, from a third person
description, the origins of the universe(s) are first person plural
convenient fictions. But I don't like so much to sum up such things
that far. It is better to grasp such kind of conclusion by oneself, so
that we are not distracted by the special connotation due to the
choice of the vocabulary, which is always misleading, especially in
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