On 09 May 2011, at 13:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Could you elaborate more on your statement? One reason that the world is not thought to be Newtonian is that in a Newtonian universe our atoms would not be stable. Max Planck was driven to postulate his constant because Newtonian physics predicts an ultraviolet catastrophe for the electromagnetic radiation emitted by a hot object.

Yes. the discovery of the quantum facts leads to the abandon of Newtonian physics. More easily the Newtonian universe is incompatible with digital mechanism. This should be obvious by the UDA, and I refer you to it. Ask if you have a specific problem with some statement. Note also that Newton was aware that Newtonian physics was incompatible with some astronomical facts, and he was aware that his physics was problematic with the behavior of light. In fact both Newton and Huygens already point on facts which announce quantum mechanics.

Does it matter that while dreaming all experiences, especially those that involve the appearance of other persons is purely solipsistic? In other words, When I dream, all that I could be aware of is purely a product of my brain. Well, let me weaken that claim a bit since it has been shown that noise and other stimuli in the environment of the sleeper has some appreciable effects on dream content, nevertheless the “what I am aware of” is clearly is not determined by external states of affairs. Malcolm, whoever that is..., is using the usual definition of existence that I rail against as it is dependent of physical instantiation, I am not sure that this would weaken his claims. But dreams as computations within computations (ala video games) seems unproblematic but it does not advance the discussion as far as I can tell, but the issue of “diary contents are not communicable” seems to weaken the argument for 1p indeterminism. I say this because unless there is some means to communicate the subjective experiences of our teleported and copied person to a witness that can compare the state of “I am in Moscow” and “I am in Washington” how are we to reason about the 1p of the person that is teleported?

It does not weaken the argument for indeterminacy. It just illustrates that such an indeterminacy is 1p, and thus not communicable. It is rather natural in a theory on consciousness, which is also not communicable.

We might be making a person into a zombie by teleporting them! How could we know that we are not unless we can communicate the content of the diary?

We cannot. That is why I insist so much that mechanism asks for an act of faith, and belongs to (scientific) theology.

I cannot just blindly accept the postulate of physical supervenience of subjective experience in this case since we do not have a clear and falsifiable model of consciousness/qualia yet! (Well, other than yours.)

Never accept anything blindly. But then, as you say, comp is falsifiable.

I, personally, have been trying to lucid dream for a long time and have not had any success at it, but I know people that report that they can. I can only bet that it occurs as I do not have 1 person knowledge that it is true, but even if I did have a lucid dream experience, how would I test to be sure that I am not hallucinating that I am lucid?

You can't. A lucid dream is nothing more than a dream in which you conclude that you are dreaming, but like for the awaken state, you can never been 100% sure.

This is a bit of a fly paper that we can get stuck on! The point is that dreamign seems to show a counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires self-awareness. It is my claim that self- awareness requires consciousness, but consciousness is a passive property that all logics (that have stone duals) have.


(This claim is similar to Chalmer’s idea that consciousness is a basic property like mass and charge.)

That needs a non-comp theory.

Self-awareness emerges from active updating self-modeling within and between the logics and requires some form of evolution; it is dependent on a “flow of time”.

All terms are too much ambiguous, and can be interpreted differently with different assumptions.

What would be the English version of Bp v DDt ? Could you give us an example of this?

It means that "either p is true in all accessible worlds or I can access to a transitory world (a non cul-de-sac world)". In arithmetic, it means that p is provable or it is consistent that I am consistent. The link with lucidity is not obvious, and beyond the scope of this post.

What do you mean by omniscience? Do you mean the closure for the modus ponens rule (like in logic), or the God-like knowledge of everything, like in (pseudo) religion?

It is related to the closure issue for modus ponens in the sense that the list of premises must be complete for the conclusion to be certain truth, thus for a conclusion to be True in an absolute sense, one must have an “omniscient list”.

This does not make sense for me.

This passage from the http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/ article is also related to my concerns:

This is rather good. Except for minor details.
It gives the reference to the Esakia paper I talked about, on the topological interpretation of G (that he calls GL).

Sure, the consistency constraint would allow for WR so long as they could be interpreted as hallucinations, noise, swamp gas, etc. So long as there is a means to ‘explain away” the WR in the 3p case, which is where we take into account the appearance of interactions between “machines”, then my claim would hold. The idea is like that in the Surprise 20 questions game, the sequential answers that any 1p would obtain of the states of affairs of the world that is experienced could be stochastic or random sampling of an ensemble (as in the SSA) but are constrained to not contradict any prior answer. This idea requires “book keeping'” and thus seems to require a physical world to act as the persisting structure to record the past states of observer moments. It is as the physical world that is the “tape” for the UD in my thinking. OTOH, this “physical world” should not be considered as an ontologically primitive as it too is, ultimately, a fiction supervening on the bisimulations between quantum systems. In my ontology only quantum systems (as stone spaces) and their logics are primitive up to degeneracy in the limit of the totality of existence, AKA Nothing (as in Bertrand Russell’s neutral monism) .

You should expose your theory, once and for all. Then we can see if it is coherent or not with the mechanist hypothesis. You make too much unrelated precise statements so that I could comment them. It is too much fuzzy, sorry.

To put this idea into mythological terms, I ask that we consider that Creation of the Universe is an (ultimately eternal) ongoing process instead of a Special one-time event. I see this idea as consistent with the UD as per your discussions but it requires that the UD not be reducible to some a priori existing and static hypostase or number.

You seem to change your mind on this, a lot of time. But once we assume mechanism, there are no more choice in the matter. The UD exist like the number PI exist, and the flow of time exists in the mind of the relative numbers. The universes don't appear, from a third person description, the origins of the universe(s) are first person plural convenient fictions. But I don't like so much to sum up such things that far. It is better to grasp such kind of conclusion by oneself, so that we are not distracted by the special connotation due to the choice of the vocabulary, which is always misleading, especially in fundamental matter.



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