On 10 May 2011 19:11, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>> This seems to me to be a very central point.  Chalmers gives very
>> convincing arguments why an "Aristotelian machine's" expressed
>> behaviour (including its "thoughts" and "beliefs") are
>> indistinguishable from a conscious person's - excepting only that it
>> is not IN FACT conscious (!).
>
> How does he establish that it is not conscious?

Sorry if this wasn't clear.  In this context, by "Aristotelian
machine" I simply meant Chalmers' zombie.  It's unconscious by
stipulation, i.e. he points out that the ascription of first-person
consciousness is inessential to a complete (in principle) account of
its (or indeed our) behaviour in third-person terms.

> The problem with computationalism is that "exists => is computed" does not
> entail "computed => exists" and if you hypothesize the latter it explains
> too much.

The critical issue would indeed seem to be whether when "you
hypothesize the latter it explains too much".  If so, then I guess by
Bruno's lights comp would be refuted (i.e the conjunction of CTM and a
"primitive" material TOE).

David

> On 5/10/2011 9:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 10 May 2011 13:21, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>  wrote:
>>
>>
>>>> What does it mean for numbers to understand?
>>>>
>>> Suppose I can answer this in a way that you understand. Then it means the
>>> same things for the numbers.
>>>
>> This seems to me to be a very central point.  Chalmers gives very
>> convincing arguments why an "Aristotelian machine's" expressed
>> behaviour (including its "thoughts" and "beliefs") are
>> indistinguishable from a conscious person's - excepting only that it
>> is not IN FACT conscious (!).
>
> How does he establish that it is not conscious?
>
>> This alone should be enough (as indeed
>> he argues) to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a metaphysics of
>> matter, unless consciousness itself is to be denied (which, as Deutsch
>> argues in his most recent book, is just bad explanation).  It seems as
>> if, starting from an Aristotelian perspective, there is no way this
>> puzzle can be resolved even with the addition of various ad hoc
>> assumptions (such as Chalmers himself attempts, unsuccessfully IMO);
>> the assumed primacy of "material processes" inevitably ends in the
>> vitiation of "mental" explanation, in this view of the matter.  To
>> resolve the puzzle it seems that "material processes" and "mental
>> processes" (or, one might say, material and mental explanations) must
>> emerge as deeply correlated aspects of a single narrative. Hence, if
>> computationalism is to be the explanation for the mental, it must
>> likewise suffice as that of the material.
>
> The problem with computationalism is that "exists => is computed" does not
> entail "computed => exists" and if you hypothesize the latter it explains
> too much.
>
> Brent
>
>>  From this perspective, as
>> you say, it is then of the essence that any explanation must "mean the
>> same things for the numbers" as it does for me.
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>
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